

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

WJR
BOROUHMAND,
Abdolvahman

FROM : AmConsulate, ISFAHAN

12
SER. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 12, 1937

DATE

REF :

	ACTION	DEPT.
For Dept. Use Only	REC'D	I N F O OTHER

SUBJECT: POLITICAL Opinions of an Isfahani Intellectual

Over a period of six months this reporter and other officers of the Consulate have become acquainted with Dr. Abdolvahman BOROUHMAND, a member of a well-known and affluent Isfahani family. The Consulate feels that some of Dr. Borouhmand's observations may be of value to the Department since he represents the thinking of many western-educated citizens of good family who appear to be, increasingly restive over present conditions in Iran.

Dr. Borouhmand is approximately 34 years old. He is married and has one child with another on its way. His wife is a member of the KARIM family, one of the wealthiest in Isfahan. He attended local schools and the University of Tehran where he studied law. After receiving his license, he went to Switzerland where he enrolled in the University of Geneva, obtaining his Doctorate in International Law in 1936. His thesis was entitled "La Licite Constitutionnelle de la Conclusion des Traités Institutionnels et Commentaire Supplémentaire". Since his return to Iran he has concerned himself with the running of the extensive family estates in co-operation with four of his brothers. This responsibility was further increased with the sudden death of his father, Mohamed BOROUHMAND, last Spring. However, with the return of a fifth brother from the United States where he was studying agriculture, Mr. Borouhmand will now be able to leave Isfahan for Tehran to clerk in the law office of MOHAMMAD prior to being recognized as a qualified lawyer. Both he and his wife speak good French; the latter accompanied her husband to Europe and is a poised, outgoing conversant for her husband. They speak no English.

Mr. Borouhmand's father was considered one of the more progressive landlords in the Isfahan area and the possessor of four villages which the family owns has been held up as a model for other landlords. This reporter has made four trips to the villages which occupy a tract of approximately 6,000 square acres situated on the new asphalt road leading north to Tehran. He has been impressed with the organization of the villages and the attempt which has been made to ameliorate the conditions of the peasants. The latter appear to be cleaner and healthier than any that this reporter has seen and the rows of two-room houses, each with its garden and separate stables for livestock, are kept in good condition by their occupants. The estate boasts a well-built peasant-school erected by the Borouhmand family. Water is supplied by a huge dam which flows into a reservoir whence it is divided into four equal parts for distribution to the four villages which

Thomas J. []

REPORTER

CLASSIFIED BY: []

February 11, Embassy TEHRAN

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 27, 1961.

PLACE: Suren's Restaurant

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Abdorrahman Borumand
Franklin J. Crawford, Second Secretary of Embassy

Dr. Borumand described his 56 days in the Tehran police jail following his arrest on July 20 as relatively pleasant, saying he had ample time for reading and exercise and was well provided for with food sent from home.

During the time of his imprisonment he had frequent contact with Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the National Freedom Movement. Borumand said that the differences between the National Front and the National Freedom Movement were practically non-existent. Bazargan represents a more religious element in the nationalist group than members of the National Front, and is himself personally very religious. Dr. Borumand described adherents of the National Freedom Movement as perhaps "more violent" than the moderate leadership of the National Front. He intimated that the differences between the two groups were more of emphasis than of anything else.

Before his release from prison Dr. Borumand was obliged to give a guarantee that he would not leave Tehran without the permission of the security authorities. His wife and children have now come to Tehran from Isfahan, and he is busy seeing to the completion of a house which he is building in Shemran. After that he intends to open a law practice.

Dr. Borumand described the present government of Dr. Asini as illegal and unconstitutional. He said that if he were forced to make a choice, he would be obliged to say that Dr. Asini's Government represents an improvement over the past governments of Sharif-Basmi and Eqbal. Nevertheless, Asini has demonstrated to Borumand's satisfaction that his government is essentially feeble and has obtained no meaningful authority from the Shah. The Shah, he said, still commands the army, the police and the security forces, and these represent the real power in the country.

He said that an accommodation between the Asini Government and the National Front was a present impossibility. This stems from the fact that the Asini Government is essentially the Shah's government and the Shah is not prepared to concede anything to the National Front. The National Front, he said, has made efforts over the past few years to reach some sort of an understanding with the Shah but has been completely rebuffed. The Shah's attitude toward the National Front was reaffirmed at the "historic meeting" on the 2nd of Mordad. Power is blind, Borumand said, as history demonstrates, and there is nothing to suggest that the Shah will change his views and make any concessions.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: 5 p.m., September 26, 1961 at Dr. Sanjabi's home.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Chairman, Executive Committee,
National Front.
Franklin J. Crawford, Second Secretary of Embassy

Dr. Sanjabi's comments on the political scene in Iran showed him to be generally discouraged. He characterized Dr. Amini as a man who was good with words but so far had produced little. The economic situation of the country was extremely bad, and, while he did not blame Dr. Amini entirely, Sanjabi said Amini was partially responsible because of the suddenness with which he had imposed restraints on the economy, particularly with regard to credit. Moreover, he described the Amini Government as a mendicant government going all over the world begging for funds. On this score, however, he allowed, with a smile, that it was only a question of degree and not of kind between the Amini Government and its predecessors.

Sanjabi spoke at some length of the government's political failures, particularly its illegal position in deferring elections indefinitely. He said that the National Front's great concern at present was to acquire freedom to act and to organize. As it is, the National Front is not allowed to operate its club or to publish newspapers or pamphlets. As a matter of fact, he said, mention of the name "National Front" is forbidden in the press, with the exception of occasional mention in the English-language press for the benefit of foreigners. As an example of this, he cited a letter written by students of Tehran University offering to participate voluntarily in the government's anti-illiteracy campaign. He said the letter appeared in Kayhan on September 26 without any indication that the letter had been signed by Tehran University students "affiliated with the National Front."

Dr. Sanjabi said he hoped and expected that the academic year at Tehran University would be calm so that the students would have an opportunity to pursue their studies and not become the victims of the imposed holidays of last year. He said that he agreed with the government and the security organizations that the University was not a proper arena for political activity. On the other hand, he said, students were entitled to a meeting place at which they could discuss their political ideas. Therefore, he had suggested to the Prime Minister at a recent meeting, which included members of the National Front and the Chancellor of the University, that the National Front Club be allowed to open. The Prime Minister countered with his own proposal that a Palace of Youth be opened as a gathering place for students. Dr. Sanjabi said he told the Prime Minister that he doubted any government-sponsored organization like this would amount to anything more than the government-sponsored Melliyun

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

1			
TITLE OF CASE AND ALIAS SHAYEGAN, Ali		RELATIVE FILE A-11589431	FILE LINE 410
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH March 3, 1903 - Sulair Fara, Iran		TYPE OF INVESTIGATION Applicant for Admission - Subversive	
DATE, PLACE, AND NUMBER OF LAST ENTRY IN U.S. May 25, 1958 - New York, N.Y. as B-2 visitor.		NATIONALITY Iran	
OFFICE OF ORIGIN, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION, AND FIELD OFFICE New York, New York		PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT Feb. 19, 20, 21; Mar. 2, 5, 9, 1962	

SYNOPSIS

Investigation conducted pursuant to memorandum dated February 7, 1962 from the Applications Section, New York requesting investigation to determine whether any grounds of inadmissibility can be developed based on subversive grounds or under Section 212(a)(27) in that the SUBJECT'S presence in the United States may be prejudicial to the public interest, security or welfare of the United States.

Other than derogatory information furnished by a source of NYC-I-230 all other government agencies failed to furnish any derogatory information.

Witnesses furnished by the Foreign Address and Occupational Index, witnesses cognizant of Iranian affairs, and officials of the Iranian Consulate all failed to furnish any information of a derogatory nature.

SUBJECT in a sworn statement dated February 19, 1962 denied ever giving any support or sympathy to the Shah Party (Communist Party of Iran) while a member of the Iranian Parliament. He does not believe in the overthrow of government by force or violence and would like to see a constitutional monarchy established in Iran.

SEARCHED	INDEXED	FILED	REFERRED TO CONTROL OFFICE
DISTRIBUTION		REPORT MADE BY	
1 - Applications Section, New York w/ file A-11589431 and on "A"		DATE March 15, 1962	
1 - FBI New York		Investigator _____ Special Agent in Charge	
		REVIEWED AND APPROVED	
		DATE _____	
		SIGNATURE _____	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Foreign Service of the United States of America

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran

Feb. 21, 1957

REPORTING OFFICER

KOC/Clark/ma

BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

INSTRUCTIONS
For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.

COPIES TO

GTI

NAME

SALEH, Alayar

NATIONALITY

Iranian

PRESENT POSITION

Head of Iran Party

DATA AND REMARKS

SUPPLEMENTARY BIOGRAPHIC DATAFamily:

Saleh's father, Mobaser-el-Masalek, was a landowner who was known for his democratic ideas. His father and mother, Khorehid Klqa, had eight boys of which Alayar was the fourth.

Career:

1945: Represented Iran in San Francisco at the first United Nations Conference.

1950-52: While a deputy in the 16th Majlis, Saleh was a member of the National Front, Chief of the Mixed Oil Commission, member of the Iranian Mission to the Security Council when Iran defended itself on the oil nationalization question, and Counselor of the Iranian Mission before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Aug. 1953: Submitted his resignation as Iranian Ambassador to Washington and returned to Iran.

1953-56: Under surveillance by the government as leader of the National Resistance Movement.

April 1956: Took best (refuge) in the Majlis building and went on a hunger strike for one day in the Majlis as a protest against the rigging of the elections (see Embdes. 868, April 12, 1956, Confidential; and Embdes. 875, April 14, 1956, Confidential). Was removed with a minimum of effort by the local authorities, after which he went home where he was kept under surveillance.

Jan. 21 1957: In the name of the Iran Party, Saleh published a communique in which he announced his approval of President Eisenhower's new policy for the Middle East, and of the Iranian Constitution. The communique aroused violent protest in the

Majlis

Submit to Department in Triplicate

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Continue Data and Remarks on Plain Sheets

B-0

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 16, 1963

SUBJECT: Meeting Between Alayar SALEH and Ali AMINI
and Recent Developments in the National Front

PLACE: Mr. Miller's House

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Cyrus QANI, Secretary
The Industrial Mining and Development Bank

1. On November 14, Cyrus Qani and Feridun MAHDAVI paid a call on Alayar Saleh. Mr. Qani said that Alayar Saleh told them that Ali Amini had called upon him to discuss the current political situation and to sound him (Saleh) out on a possible coalition. Saleh told Qani that Amini and he agreed on all major issues including those of oil and foreign affairs. Saleh said, according to Qani, that the National Front organization would honor all past foreign commitments, including the oil agreements. Saleh told Amini that he was well aware of the world oil situation and that the National Front would attempt to change the oil agreement only through rational and possible means.

Saleh pointed out to Amini, Qani said, that major elements of the National Front distrusted him for his past actions, but that the National Front would support any genuine national movement, including one led by Ali Amini should he come to power.

2. Qani reported that Saleh had not yet made up his mind as to future National Front tactics nor had he selected a new council of seven or a new executive council. Saleh was still debating whether to establish a completely new executive council composed largely of the more militant younger members of the National Front as had been rumored.

Saleh, according to Qani, was giving serious thought to his successor, being well aware of the need to prepare a new leadership for the National Front to take over in the near future.

Saleh expressed to Qani his anxiety over the University students. Qani said that they had broken away from the leadership of Saleh, stating that

cc: Group 4 because
DCM Downgraded at 3 year intervals.
Mr. Hars Declassified 12 years after date of origin.
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Martin F. Hers

April 15, 1964

Joseph P. Lorenz

Developments in the National Front

Under SALEH told me at lunch yesterday that, with the exception of a certain amount of jockeying for position among the leadership, there was presently little going on in the National Front. Only four seats out of seven on the Executive Committee had been filled, and Alahyar Saleh was presently trying to find suitable people for the other three. He had offered one of the positions to Feridun MAHDAVI, who had refused it. Although the ostensible reason for Mahdavi's refusal was that he would have been overwhelmed by the conservative leadership, Saleh speculated that the real reason may have been the strong desire of Mahdavi's mother that he become less active in politics. In any case, Alahyar Saleh had actually intended to give Mahdavi substantial authority; now, much as he wanted to bring in new blood, there was no one left in the younger generation who he felt merited being named to the Executive Committee. Another leadership problem, according to Saleh, was that Qolam Hessein SADEQI had definitely stopped participating actively in National Front affairs. While Sadeqi's opinions did not differ greatly from those of Alahyar Saleh, Sadeqi liked to run things himself and was unwilling to submit to party discipline.

Saleh said that he knew of no contacts between the Mansur government and the National Front. He commented that in his opinion a rapprochement was even less likely at present than when the Alam and Amini governments came to power, simply because the present government was more concerned with economic problems than with any liberalization in the political sphere.

Saleh tended to discount the recent letter of Mosadeq to Iranian students abroad. He said that Mosadeq's letter was indeed highly critical of the present moderate policy of the Front, but that Mosadeq had been critical of the leadership for years, and the only effect of his statements had been to give the radical elements of the National Front something to talk about.

FOL:JPLorenz:caak

4/16/64

Group 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals.

Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

cc: JR
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CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN

Allahyar SALEHI

National Front Leader



(1952)

Allahyar Salehi, a founder of the now-defunct Iran Party, is a leader of the opposition National Front (NF). He has become a symbol of Iranian nationalist sentiment, second in popularity only to the retired nationalist leader and former Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq. A former ambassador to the US and eight times a cabinet minister, he commands a greater following than any other native nationalist figure. During 1963, however, the NF suffered a series of setbacks. Salehi's response was to seek for grounds of compromise between the NF and the Government. This policy drew down upon him a heavy criticism from the more militant elements of the NF, culminating in letters to the NF from its venerated but inactive founder, Mohammad Mosaddeq, which supported Salehi's critics. In May 1964 Salehi resigned as chairman of the NF Executive Committee, a post he had held since September 1962.

Salehi is a mild-mannered, vacillating man and an unimpressive speaker. His popularity is ascribed to his uncompromising honesty and dedication to principle, his ready availability to his supporters, and his close association with Mosaddeq in the past, rather than political skill. Vehemently anti-Communist, he has resisted all efforts by the Tudeh (Communist) Party to ally with the NF. During the January 1963 referendum, Salehi collaborated with the mullahs in opposition to the Shah's six-point reform program, which Salehi believed was misleading and insincere.

Salehi's position in the National Front is somewhat ambiguous. Although he was for many years its most popular leader, he has never controlled it. Originally formed in 1950 under the leadership of Mosaddeq, the NF today is a loose confederation of nationalist parties held together by the image of Mosaddeq and by their common opposition to the Government. Generally anti-Communist and pro-reform, it is basically a middle class movement, led by university graduates who find their opportunities in present-day Iran limited. During the Mosaddeq period Salehi was the leader of the strongest party within the NF, and this fact coupled with the admiration which his honesty, unequalled in Iranian politics, inspires, accounts in large part for his present prestige.

Salehi's political ideas, which he has evolved over his 39 years of political activity, are simple and moderate. He believes that rapid economic progress is Iran's only defense against a revolution of the educated classes. His opposition to Communism is based on a clear perception of Soviet strategy and tactics. Fearing British economic domination almost as much as Soviet political domination, he finds US support a

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

File Banjabani
B10
A-2



شماره ۱۲/۲۷۹۲۸-۳-۱۹۰۰

تاریخ ۱۳۵۷/۷/۲۲

وزارت امور خارجه

اداره سندنامه و روادید

OCT 23

یادداشت

ایالات متحده آمریکا

وزارت امور خارجه شاهنشاهی با اظہار تعارفات خود سفارت

سنجایی

احتراماً یک جلدگذرنامه سیاسی متعلق به جناب آقای دکتر کریم

را تالوا ایفاد میدارد خواهشمنداست دستور فرمائید روادید لازم صادر گردد.

موقع را برای تجدید احترامات فائقه مقتمن میشمارد

یکماه ویزیت

سفارت ایالات متحده آمریکا - تهران

پاورقی

- دادن گذرنامه سیاسی از طرف وزارت خارجه شاه به فردی که به عنوان یکی از مخالفین تبلیغ می شود آنهم در بحران جریانات انقلاب جای سوالات فراوانی را باز می کند. پ.ع



SADSI, Gholam Hossein

Supplementing Embassy's CRD of January 17, 1951.

Career:

1929: Left for France.
1937: Received Doctorate in Literature, University of Paris.
1946-date: Professor of Modern Philosophy and Sociology, University of Tehran.

December 12, 1951: Minister of PTT, Mosadeq's Cabinet.

Remarks:

The appointment of Dr. Sadeqi to a Cabinet post came as a complete surprise to most commentators, since he has never courted public office and has repeatedly expressed his disinterest in practical politics. Furthermore, as a Professor of Philosophy and Sociology, it is unlikely that he can offer much to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. Aside from his active participation in UNESCO, Dr. Sadeqi has been an inconspicuous figure, unknown outside the University. It is believed that the appointment is probably temporary, designed chiefly to help fill the gaps in Dr. Mosadeq's ailing Cabinet until the elections are completed. No source was able to offer any information on Dr. Sadeqi's previous relationships with Dr. Mosadeq or other members of the National Front.

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350.3

See Key Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 11
Resp. No. 63
From Tehran

Full Insp. 5/14/59

EQBAL, Manuchehr (Basic biographic report of Sept. 15, 1952; supplemental of March 4, 1954; and many despatches)

Rumors of the possible fall of the Prime Minister and his cabinet are reported in Tehran publications every few weeks. However, through luck and ability, Eqbal has weathered all crises so far, and probably will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. He has maintained his position for the near-record time of more than two years principally by avoiding any major crises which would cause the Shah to lose faith in him or force the Shah to get rid of him as a scapegoat. The removal of ENTICHAJ was a victory for Eqbal and places in his hands much more direct responsibility for the management of Iran's development program, a duty which the Prime Minister welcomes.

There are serious doubts that Eqbal is kept informed on all the Shah's major decisions, but given the nature of the present Iranian government, no Prime Minister should expect to be told everything. However, in the day-to-day affairs of government, Eqbal works hard, keeps himself well informed and is doing an acceptable and honest job. He seems to want to be a real Prime Minister, and given the handicaps of the Shah's own power, he has worked honestly in that direction. He, however, has no true national following and his power is based only on the goodwill of the Shah.

FORUHAR, Darius (CAS reports that full biographic information on this man is available in Washington)

Foruhar is the young and intellectual leader of the Pan-Iran Party. He, like ATAI and BAQAI, is not actively back by MOSADEQ, although Mosadeq is said to respect his ability. Actually, though, his ties are much closer to Alayar SALEH, and Foruhar calls himself a follower of Saleh.

Foruhar was originally interested in the idea of Pan-Iran (the reclaiming of Iran's "lost" territories), but his ideology today centers on a neutralist freedom from all the great powers. He is strongly anti-communist.

QOLSHAYAN, Abbas Qoli (Basic biographic report of June 25, 1956 and Tabriz's report of Sept. 27, 1956. Various despatches and cards)

Qolshayan is one of Iran's major political figures, an able and honest administrator and a potential possibility as Prime Minister. In conversation, he speaks directly and bluntly about

CONFIDENTIAL
19

*این فرد
را به
شاه
پیشنهاد
کردند*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum NOFORN/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 21 October 1965
P-300/65

FROM : CAS *W*

SUBJECT: Sentence of Darius Foruhar

AB
WT *W*

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source.

On or about 16 October 1965 Dariush Foruhar, leader of the Mellat-e Iran (Iran Nation) Party, was sentenced to three years imprisonment by the presiding judge of ordinary Military Court No. 2. Foruhar was arrested thirteen months ago.

Bayan Salem

troubledmaker, in jail before

appeals court approved sentence

1 year will prob. be deducted, other periods of arrest before prob. not

Sahran Namazi tried by another court



S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IRAN

Daryush FORUHAR

Leader of Nation of Iran Party

Daryush Foruhar is one of the National Front's younger, more radical figures who in recent years have increasingly criticized the front's more moderate leadership for its alleged over-cautious attitude. He is a militant nationalist in the Nazi mold and noted for his virulent anti-Communism. Although he originally called for Iran's return to its ancient geographical and political greatness, he has more recently emphasized neutrality and freedom from foreign influence. While not an intellectual, Foruhar is a devoted advocate of his cause and a talented organizer and propagandist. His Nation of Iran Party is the National Front's most militant, well-organized component. It is under close surveillance by the government, and Foruhar, who has spent a large part of his career in jail, is currently serving a three-year term for anti-government activities.



(PRE-1966)

Pro-West, Foruhar, nevertheless, wants Iran to follow an independent policy in the manner of India. He considers CENTO useless, and is critical of military alliances, which he believes tend to shore up corrupt and unpopular governments more than they deter Communism. He admires the US, but criticizes its support of Britain and the current Iranian regime. Although he does not advocate revolution for Iran, which he says would benefit only "alien and imperialistic" elements, he doubts that the present Shah would accept a limited constitutional role.

Foruhar favors bi-lateral agreements with the US, particularly those involving economic aid. He would also accept aid from the USSR provided no strings were attached (a remote possibility in his opinion). An advocate of planned development, he would accept limited technical assistance and encourage the construction of steel mills. He is pessimistic concerning land reform, and proposes the nationalization of agricultural land and the formation of farming cooperatives. He would like to revise the oil agreements, but through negotiation rather than nationalization. Foruhar would also re-organize the army and recognize Communist China.

Born in 1928, Foruhar received his early education in Isfahan and Tehran. He graduated from the Tehran University Law Faculty in 1951. He was a founding member of the Pan-Iran Party, a right-wing nationalist group formed in 1946. In 1952 the party split three ways over the issue of support for the monarchy. Foruhar and his followers broke away and formed the Nation of Iran Party, which affiliated with then Premier Mohamad Mosadeq's National Front (NF). (The parent organization, led by Mohsen Pezeshkpur, went into a period of eclipse, and for several years Foruhar's group was referred to as the Pan-Iran Party. With the recent recrudescence of the old Pan-Iran Party, which

S-E-32 R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Fereidan TAQIZADEH, Medical Doctor, (Member of Nation of Iran Party)
Larry W. Semakis - Second Secretary of Embassy

TIME & PLACE: May 9, 1968, Residence of Hedayatolla MATIN-DAPTARI

SUBJECT: P.K. Hoveyda's Meeting with Nation of Iran Party Leader, Foruhar

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SF, POL/RF, CEROB, CRU, NIO (2), OR *11-6-68, 11-6-68, 11-6-68*

Taqizadeh said that three months ago, Prime Minister Hoveyda summoned Dariush Foruhar (leader of the Nation of Iran Party) to his office for a talk. According to Taqizadeh, Hoveyda offered Foruhar (a lawyer by profession) a job as Legal Advisor in any Ministry if Foruhar would renounce his opposition to the government. Hoveyda reportedly praised Foruhar for his leadership abilities and stressed the futility of continued political opposition to the Shah's government. Foruhar declined the offer categorically.

Taqizadeh said that Foruhar's Nation of Iran Party has a small but dedicated following. Because of the tight political controls now obtaining, he and his fellow party men are passively waiting for the right time to re-emerge as a political force. The Party stands for constitutional government in Iran and an end to the complete authority exercised by the Shah. The Party would nationalize all important economic endeavors in the country and would exact more money for Iran from the Oil Consortium. In foreign affairs the Party would seek a rapprochement with the "progressive" Arab states, and would launch a "truly independent national foreign policy." Taqizadeh claims that rural discontent in the aftermath of land reform is growing and that this discontent is directed at the Shah's government. He claimed that the government has not met the needs of the peasants previously furnished by the landlords, and that this failure has become a major source of discontent. He also feels that the Shah's government will be unable to meet the rising expectations of other elements in the population—particularly the demands of a growing middle class. Taqizadeh predicts political instability in Iran's future.

BIOGRAPHIC NOTES:

Fereidan Taqizadeh is the nephew of Sayed Hasan Taqizadeh, (an octogenarian referred to by Iranians as the "Father of the Iranian Constitution" because of his activity in the 1905 Constitutional Revolution). Fereidan is a medical doctor in his late 20's. Several years ago he was arrested because of his political activities at Tehran University and drafted into the Army where he was assigned menial tasks. He now is working at Pahlavi Hospital but hopes to go to the U.S. to study further in medicine. He claims to have acceptance:

Daryush FORUHAR
(Phonetic: ForooHAR)

IRAN

Leader, National Front
(since August 1978)

OFFICE OF
CENTRAL REFERENCE



Long active in the opposition movement, Daryush Foruhar has spent 15 of the last 20 years in prison; most recently, he was jailed from 11 November to 6 December 1978. He is the former leader of the now defunct Nation of Iran Party, one of the groups that made up the old National Front (NF) during the 1950s and 1960s. Foruhar has a law degree, but rather than practice his profession, he has used his education and propaganda talents to expose what he considers to be illegal government actions. An able political organizer, he could claim considerable credit for making the Nation of Iran Party the most militant and best organized of the parties in the NF during the late 1960s. He is an activist, who has urged street action to demonstrate popular dissatisfaction with the government. His popular appeal, particularly among university students, during the 1960s was recognized by both the government and his colleagues in the opposition movement. Firmly committed to reform and the restoration of "constitutional rule," he has refused all blandishments from the government to induce him to renounce his stands. (C)

Foruhar has been active in the opposition's current campaign to discredit the government on the basis of its human rights record. He was one of the three signers of a letter published in the French newspaper *Le Monde* in June 1977 that condemned the Shah's rule and called for the strict application of constitutional principles. In November 1977 he organized the Union of National Front Forces, which advocated the restoration of "constitutional rule" and of personal freedoms and the nationalization of industry. During 1978 he and several other opposition leaders have worked

(cont.)

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ORIGINAL CI BY 004050
REVIEW ON 7 Dec 1978
EXT BYND & YRS BY 004050
REASON C08 (1)(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CR M 78-16620

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Farzad SAHDAVI, Chief, Economics Department, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran (IMDI)
Theodore L. Eliot Jr., First Secretary of Embassy

DATE: December 9, 1975

SUBJECT: Current Iranian Political and Economic Situation

Background:

Dr. Sahdavi has just been appointed Chief of the Economics Department of the IMDI. He has previously worked in that department and in the Investment Department of the Bank. He is a member of the National Council of the National Front and, as such, was in jail for the first seven months of 1969. He is about 30 years old, received most of his training in economics in Germany (at Hamburg), France and England (London School of Economics for six months) and speaks good English and excellent German. He has not visited the United States. The purpose of the reporting officer's call was to establish contact with Dr. Sahdavi in his new job.

Substance of Conversation:

Sahdavi finds the Iranian scene dominated by the Shah's reform program which he admits has stolen the National Front's thunder. But he questions the sincerity of the Shah as a reformer on a number of counts. In the first place, he is not prepared to believe that a man "who epitomized the forces of reaction" for seven years has suddenly become a liberal. Moreover, if the Shah believes in reform, why is he using the same old guard like Mansur, Qbel and Sharif-mani to carry it out?

Sahdavi believes the Shah was motivated in launching his "reform" program primarily by foreign political considerations. This is to say that the Shah was concerned that his image abroad was beginning to resemble Trujillo's and Diaz's. He was concerned at the reaction especially of the incoming Kennedy Administration to this image. He therefore set about changing the image. It follows, says Sahdavi, that if the Shah feels there is less pressure from the United States for reform in Iran, the Shah will be less reform-minded. Sahdavi believes that the Shah probably thinks that there will now be a period of less pressure because the Johnson Administration will be concerned for the next few months primarily with domestic U.S. matters. The Shah will therefore move very slowly on such things as the second stage of land distribution. Should the pressure from the United States be turned on again, the Shah will turn on his "White Revolution" again, something he can always do with much fanfare including ousting people who he will say were blocking his reforms and calling "reformers" (Arabs?) back into office.

"Declassified following December 9, 1975"

EX-100 (REV. 12-13-60)

CONFIDENTIALTCE
Interesting
M

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 21, 1965

SUBJECT: Political and Economic Situation in Iran

PLACE: Caspian Hotel Restaurant

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. FereyduN MAHDAVI, Industrial and Mining Development Bank;
National Front Leader
Theodore L. Eliot Jr., First Secretary of Embassy

1. Political Situation

Dr. Mahdavi was more pessimistic about the political situation than I have observed him in the past, in the sense that he feels that the situation of the opposition to the regime is bleaker than it has ever been. The security forces are in control and have let it be known that the slightest sign of opposition will be crushed. The Shah has let it be known that any opposition to the government is opposition to him personally and will not be tolerated. As a result nobody in the opposition dares raise his voice; even AMINI and his group are quiet.

The National Front has, Dr. Mahdavi observed, been put out of commission by the recent arrests of many of its secondary leaders and of Khalil MALEKI. He believes the arrests resulted from SAVAK's desire to thwart recent attempts to reorganize and reconstitute the National Front. The recent London Economist article on the opposition precipitated the arrests. MATIN-DAPTARY was singled out because of his contact with MOGADEQ. Dr. Mahdavi does not think that the arrests were connected with General MASSIRI's effort to consolidate his control of SAVAK.

The outlook for the opposition is bleak for the foreseeable future, Mahdavi believes, because the two main props of the regime, the financial situation and the army, appear to be solid props. He no longer thinks (hopes) that an economic crisis will soon precipitate a political crisis. He has a vague notion that if the Shah moves too close to the Soviets, some military leaders may become disenchanted with him, but he is not very hopeful that that would happen.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.CONFIDENTIAL

AFME awards Iranian Congress Fellowship

1/12/60

American Friends of the Middle East (AFME) today announced award of the Congressional Fellowship to Mr. Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari. Mr. Matin-Daftari, Director of the Office of Information and Press Relations of the Ministry of Justice, will leave Iran next month for Washington, D.C. where he will spend nine months working as an assistant to one or several of the members of the United States Congress and Senate. He is the first Iranian to be honored by this grant which is worth \$5000.

The American Friends of the Middle East, which is sponsoring this fellowship, is a private, non-profit American organization dedicated to improving understanding between the people of America and the countries of the Middle East.

American Friends of the Middle East in Tehran operates a Student Counseling and Orientation program to assist students going to America; another program called the Individual Resources Development Program to assist these students to obtain employment and re-adjust when they return to Iran; and John Bruner Memorial Periodical Library of technical and scientific literature to help Iranian graduates of American Universities keep abreast of the latest developments in the field in which they studied while in the United States. AFME also sponsors People-to-People programs, of which this award is a typical one.



MR. MATIN-DAFTARI

The purpose of the Congressional Fellowship which Mr. Matin-Daftari has received, is to enable outstanding young men to gain experience in democratic government by working with a Senator or Representative throughout one complete session of Congress. In past years, persons from Malaya, Formosa, and Japan, as well as selected Americans, have been chosen to participate in this program.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is son of Senator Dr. Ahmad Matin-Daftari, former Prime Minister. He was educated at Firooz Bahram Secondary School in Iran and Ellesmere College and Cambridge University in England. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Law from Cambridge in 1956. Since his return to Iran, he has worked in the Ministry of Education and as a faculty assistant at the University of Tehran. He assumed his present position of Director of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Justice in 1953. Mr. Matin-Daftari also serves as Secretary to the Society for the Protection of Prisoners and their families, and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Iranian Association for the United Nations.

Mr. Matin-Daftari is married to the former Miss Mariam Vaseh-Noori. She is planning to accompany him to the United States along with their small son. Together they will be received upon arrival in the United States by Harold Minor, former United States Ambassador in Lebanon and now President of American Friends of the Middle East in Washington, D.C. At this ceremony Mr. Matin-Daftari will meet the Congressman with whom he will be working.

P. 10
JK

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary. Based on original document.

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Iran

REPORT NO. NIT-6005

SUBJECT Hedayatollah Matin-Deftari

DATE OF REPORT 8 October 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES 0

DATE OF INFO. 1 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (1 October 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: A well-educated Iranian (C) who is a National Front committee member.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

Hedayatollah Matin-Deftari, the member of the National Front publications committee who was recently arrested then released, is one of the members of the National Front sub-committee responsible for writing the articles which appear in the National Front News. As a member of this committee, he has cooperated to a great extent with Mohammad Ali Keshavars-Sadr, the propaganda committee chairman, in giving the National Front newspaper its anti-American slant. In fact, Matin-Deftari has frequently boasted at propaganda committee meetings that he has been able to put "the cap over the eyes" of the stupid, gullible Americans. Matin-Deftari claims to have close friendships with members of the American Embassy Political Section. As an example of his attitude, Matin-Deftari at a recent propaganda committee meeting told how he propagandizes the Americans, making them think he is their friend and giving them nationalist secrets, while all the while they are courting him, he is actually the one writing the anti-American propaganda.

Field Comment: Several reports have been received which clearly indicate that Matin-Deftari is the man who writes much of the anti-American propaganda which appears in the National Front News. Matin-Deftari, the grandson of Mohammad Mossadeq and the son of Senator Ahmad Matin-Deftari, a former Prime Minister, spent one year in the United States on a grant as a Congressional fellow.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI, Lawyer and National Front Member
Archib M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Caspian Hotel for Lunch

Date: October 14, 1964

Allahyar Saleh

Matin-Daftari is obviously totally opposed to Saleh's leadership. Just as obviously he is loyal to his grandfather, Mossadeq, and the influence Mossadeq exerts on the National Front. He said that Saleh's greatest error was in urging the Front to become a political party and attempting to forge a unified political ideology from divergent political expressions of the member groups. Matin-Daftari insisted that Saleh has already lost whatever right to leadership he once had, and that after great forbearance Mossadeq finally stepped in and gave orders that Saleh's leadership should no longer be recognized. When asked who leads the National Front today, he replied "Mossadeq." When asked who, then, could be said to be the organizational leader on a day-to-day operational basis, he replied "the leaders of the groups which make up the National Front." Matin-Daftari went on to add that Saleh is not the leader of the Iran Party as he once was, and thus should not even be included in this collective leadership group.

National Front Goals

Matin-Daftari viewed the goal of the National Front as the achievement of liberty for all Iranian citizens. As a corollary he added the goal of a return to constitutional government. He emphatically stated that the Front does not want to gain office, but only to influence the existing government or a successor government to allow more freedom and to honor the constitution. He expressed the organizational theory of the Front as that of a grouping of autonomous political organizations possessing heterogeneous political philosophies but cooperating in order to work toward the Front's common goals. When asked what programs the Front desired to put forth as its proposals for the future of Iran, Matin-Daftari answered that the Front could not afford to bicker over the details of programs because of its wide spectrum of political philosophy and thus must avoid formulating specific political platforms and concentrate on the need for freedom and constitutional government.

Groups Within The National Front

Matin-Daftari pictured the Freedom Movement of Iran as a militantly Moslem group which has a substantial following because of its religious

Group 4

Downgraded at 7 year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

POST

Tehran

DATE

July 3, 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Foreign Service of the United States of America

BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

INSTRUCTIONS

For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.

REPORTING OFFICER

Larry W. Semakis

COPIES TO

NAME

Hedayatollah MATIN-DAFTARI

NATIONALITY

Iranian

PRESENT POSITION

Lawyer

DATA AND REMARKS

Birth

1933

Hedayatollah Matin-Doftari, who was born in ~~1933~~ is the son of Senator Ahmad Matin-Doftari (international lawyer and former Prime Minister) and the grandson of former Prime Minister Dr. Mohamed Mosadeq.

Education

After schooling in Tehran he went to the U.K. where he studied at Cambridge University and in 1956 received a B.A. degree in Economics and Law.

Career

Upon his return to Iran he was employed by the Ministry of Education and joined the faculty of Tehran University. In 1958 he became Director of Information and Public Relations at the Ministry of Justice. In 1960 the American Friends of the Middle East gave him a Congressional Fellowship which provided for a nine month stay in Washington, D.C. working on Capitol Hill where he was able to observe the activities of Congress. On his return he became a practicing lawyer specializing in nationality cases.

Matin-Doftari was close to his grandfather and has long been associated with the National Front movement in Iran. In 1962 he served as a member of the National Front publications committee. During the years before Mosadeq's death in 1967 he served as a channel of contact between the village-exiled former Prime Minister and National Front members. He is in close touch with those who are National Front minded, particularly among university students and other young elements. Matin-Doftari is well acquainted with the US and admires its principles; but, like many American-connected Iranians, he often feels constrained to adopt a critical attitude when in the presence of other Iranians.

Comment

Matin-Doftari is about 5'6" tall, wears glasses, has dark brown hair and a moustache. He smokes cigarettes, drinks moderately and is an avid-reader. On February 11, 1959 he was married to the former Marian Veseh-Nuri (an attractive and lively conversationalist schooled in the U.K. who shares her husband's political views), and they have two children.

Submit to Department in Triplicate

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Continue Data and Remarks on Plain Sheets

EMBASSY TEHRAN

529

October 18, 1951

Air Pouch

The Iranian Workers' Party

Recently the Embassy's Labor Attache, Mr. C. C. Finch, discussed the Iranian Workers' Party and problems related to it with Mr. Mozafar Baghai, the founder of the Party. Mr. Finch had met with him twice in July in Abadan. The discussions at that time were particularly related to the oil crisis. The latest conversation, because of its interest, is summarized in this despatch. Dr. Issa Sepahbodi, a close colleague of Dr. Baghai in the work of the Iranian Workers' Party, participated in this meeting. He impressed Mr. Finch as being at least the equal of Dr. Baghai in his intimate knowledge of the past history, present operations, and anticipated future of the Party.

During the course of this interview, Dr. Baghai discussed with Mr. Finch his reasons for going to Abadan last summer, the political aims of his party, its membership and the methods by which it is financed. Dr. Baghai also described the source and numerical strength of his support and commented in detail on specific leaders of the non-communist Iranian trade unions.

Dr. Baghai stated that he has now established branches of his party in Ahwaz, Qum, Karaj, Tehran, Shushtar, Disful and Ram Hormoz. He proposes to establish branches at Isfahan, Zanjan, and Savah.

Dr. Baghai rather defensively introduced the subject of his visit to Abadan which he allegedly made in order to establish a branch of the Workers' Party in that city. As the Department knows, he failed in that effort and was in fact said to have had his car stoned in a visit he made to the Fields Area. He now states that his visit to Abadan was not to establish a branch of the Party, but was purely a private visit and that he went with no special encouragement or instructions from the Prime Minister, contrary to the rumors current at the time of his arrival in Abadan. He stated that he hoped to establish a branch of his party in Abadan in the future, but has no present plans concerning it.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE .
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MEMORANDUM

Dec 10

TO : Mr. Roy M. Melbourne
Mr. John H. Stutesman

FROM : C. C. Finch

SUBJECT: C. C. Finch conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi

Monday, December 10, I had a conversation with Dr. Sepahbodi. He is an officer of the Iranian Workers Party and is a close friend of Dr. Bagai. Both Sepahbodi and Bagai have been members of the faculty of the University of Tehran for some years. They have a close personal relationship. I believe that it can be a safe assumption, therefore, that Sepahbodi speaks with some authority about the Iranian Workers Party.

Dr. Sepahbodi opened our conversation by stating that the Iranian Workers Party is supporting four candidates, under its own aegis. They are Mr. Yasseri (Ahwaz constituency); Dr. Gousheguir (Tistfol); Dr. Bagai (Tehran) and Dr. Sepahbodi (Tehran).

Dr. Sepahbodi emphasized repeatedly the fact that the National Front was not itself a political party but, rather, represented the "broad interests of all classes of people". In an apparent effort to give the National Front certain practical political support Sepahbodi and Bagai have been instrumental in calling together a special committee, with between 10 and 12 members to "advise" Dr. Mosadeq and to give him support. The four principal groups represented on the committee are, in the order given by Sepahbodi, (1) the followers of Kashani, (2) the Iranian Workers Party, (3) the Iran Party, and (4) the corporations of the bazaar.

Among those attending the meetings are Messrs. Hassibi, Alayar Saleh, Nariman, Moshar, Makki, and Kashani. The group has no regular officers, no parliamentary procedure and no fixed time or place to meet. Dr. Mosadeq does not attend meetings of the group because, according to Sepahbodi, he is the head of government and cannot become involved in politics. When Wullah Kashani attends meetings he is always, by acclamation, made chairman of that particular session because of "his great eminence in the affairs of Iran".

Later in the conversation Sepahbodi obliquely again referred to the committee indicating the further aim of the committee was to establish a "close group of intellectuals interested in social and administrative reform".

I also discussed with Sepahbodi the part played by the Iranian Workers Party in the demonstration and riot of December 6. He stated

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum NOFORN/INTERNAL USE ONLY

TO : Chief, Political Section

DATE: 3 November 1964
P-534/64

FROM : CAS *W*

SUBJECT: Plans of Dr. Baqai to Issue Pamphlet Attacking
the Status of Forces Agreement

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information must cite the control NOFORN but need not cite CAS as the source. The source is an Iranian official (B) with good contacts in the security services; from Baqai.

1. Dr. Mozafar Baqai said on 2 November 1964 that Ayatollah Khomeini had made a public speech in Qom on 26 October in which he attacked the Status of Forces Agreement and the 200 million dollar Arms Purchase Agreement recently passed by the Majlis.

2. Baqai stated that he himself was in the process of drafting a pamphlet to be signed with his name in which he would attack the government for sponsoring and passing the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. Baqai further stated that the line he would take vis-a-vis the Americans would be that the Americans were unwisely allowing this law to hurt their image and their reputation in Iran. Baqai also stated that he was prepared to face arrest in putting out this pamphlet, but felt it was necessary for him to take some initiative in this matter in view of the fact that he expected that others opposed to the Agreement would also attack it.

3. Baqai expressed the opinion that the Shah must have tacitly approved attacks against the Agreement made in the Majlis during the recent debate, for it was inconceivable to him that spokesmen against the Bill would have dared to do so without the Shah's prior consent.

~~EXEC AGENT
OUSARMA IRAN
64-1420~~

SECRET

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

IRAN

Mozafar BAQAI-KERMANI

President, Toilers Party and
Guardians of Freedom

Mozafar Baqai-Kermani has been a chronic oppositionist since 1949. He is a devoted nationalist, with overtones of socialism, wholeheartedly opposed to Communism, strongly anti-British but not unfriendly to the US. Within this framework, however, his politics tend to shift freely, depending on the conditions of the moment. A former supporter of ex-Premier Mohamad Mosadeq, Baqai was at one time the second most popular man in Iran. Since then his political fortunes have waned considerably. At the present time, he probably has little following beyond his two political organizations, the Toilers Party and the Guardians of Freedom--both of which are primarily personality cults without a significant popular base.



(PRE-1966)

Baqai's activities are closely circumscribed by the government, and he is opposed by both the Tudeh (Communist) Party and Mosadeq's National Front. His strength lies in his nuisance value, and is derived largely from his skill as a demagogue. In his ambition for the Premiership he would probably sacrifice a few scruples to attain it. However, he has made so many political enemies during his long career that his chances are small. One source has asserted that the Shah is willing to allow Baqai a limited amount of freedom of action as a check on the government.

Baqai was born in Kerman in 1908. His father, Shahab Kermani, was a famous patriot and Constitutionalist. Mozafar received his early education in Iran, and earned a PhD in philosophy and pedagogy from the Sorbonne in 1935. Returning to Iran, he joined the faculty of Tehran University, where he has lectured on ethics off and on ever since. In 1939-41 he completed his military service as a reserve officer. Baqai reportedly joined the Tudeh Party in 1942, but left it soon after. In 1947 he was elected to the Majlis as deputy from Kerman. He first came into prominence in 1949, when his attacks on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the army won him popular acclaim. In November 1949 he was arrested for publishing sharp criticisms of the army in his newspaper, Shahed. A court martial sentenced him to a year in prison, but he was acquitted by a civil court.

Baqai had joined Mosadeq's National Front while in the Majlis, and in May 1951 he founded the Toilers Party to serve as the right wing's answer to the growing popularity of the Tudeh Party. Baqai described the Toilers Party as "socialist in attitude so far as socialist policy is consistent with the policies of the government." By this

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

file bio

TO : POL - Mr. ~~Mohr~~
THRU : POL - Mr. Bolster
FROM : POL - ~~S.~~ Escudero

DATE: March 19, 1975

SUBJECT: Background Data: Mosafar Baqa'i

In view of his recent open letter to the Shah criticizing the establishment of the Iran Resurgence Party as both illegal and unwise, I thought you might find a little background data on Mosafar Baqa'i to be of use.

A congenital oppositionist, Baqa'i has been active in Iranian politics since the mid-1940s. He has espoused various leftist viewpoints but always with a sizeable dose of personal opportunism. He was briefly a member of the Tudeh Party, later joined the National Front and after his 1951 founding of the Toilers Party he became the second most important man in the National Front. He broke with Mossadegh in 1952 and lost considerable support for his Party in the process. Later he first supported, and then opposed, General Zahedi and has generally been in opposition to every prime minister since. As a result of his constant opposition he has few friends among the establishment but many powerful enemies. These have imprisoned or exiled him a number of times but he has always rebounded in one way or another. He has been accused, for example, of complicity in the assassination of General Razmara, the murder of Mossadegh's Chief of Police General Afshartus and a variety of lesser crimes but has usually been acquitted on appeal. As the Shah's power grew, Baqa'i's prominence decreased and he pretty much faded from sight with the rise of the Iran Novin Party.

Despite a long and tempestuous career he has had little influence on government policy except as a leader of the movement to nullify the rigged 1960 general elections. His position has been consistently nationalist, very anti-British and, perhaps beginning with the 1964 Status of Forces Agreement, rather anti-American as well. Though ambitious and opportunistic, he is regarded as honest where money is concerned, lives very simply in south Tehran and is respected by some for this.

He has used the open letter tactic at least twice in the past. Once in 1949 to criticize controls instituted by then Chief of Staff General Razmara, and again in 1953 when

BAQA'I, Mosafar



Chief Political Section

24 October 1963

P-4/63

CAS

Freedom Movement of Iran Trials

REFERENCES: NIT 6260, 3 August 1963
NIT-6282, 22 August 1963
NIT-6295, 9 September 1963

The following is for your information and whatever use you wish to make of it within the security limitations designated. Any reporting by you of this information need not cite CAS the source.

1. The government will attempt to sentence the Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI) defendants in the trial from ten to fifteen years in jail. This is said to be at the Shah's wish. (This is from an Iranian intelligence officer (C) with access to reports concerning internal security matters. We consider the information to be reliable. Date of information is 22 October 1963.)

2. The FMI in Tehran would like to stage demonstrations against the trials of the FMI leaders but they are uncertain whether it would be wise to demonstrate since such action might result in the defendants' receiving a stiffer sentence. Thus, the FMI, in coordination with the National Front students abroad, will demonstrate against the trials abroad in order to bring world attention to bear on the trial. (This is from a usually reliable source, from a central council member of the FMI. Date of information is 23 October 1963.)

3. a. The FMI is concerned that the National Front in Iran has washed its hands of the FMI trials. The FMI leaders on trial have asked those on the outside whether they should put up a stiff defense or not. The FMI on the outside is undecided what it should do.

b. Jafar Sharif-Snami has asked the Shah to pardon Mehdi Bazargan. Sharif-Snami asked this as head of the Engineers Association, of which Bazargan is also a leading member. The Shah told Sharif-Snami that the case against Bazargan was rather grave. Sharif-Snami said, "But your Majesty's compassion is greater." The Shah said he was very busy with foreign visitors at the time but that he would look into the matter. The Shah sent word to Bazargan in prison that he must come and see the Shah and beg the Shah's pardon. Bazargan refused, since this



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mohammad Tavakoli, Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI)
John D. Stempel, Political Officer, American
Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: August 21, 1978 - North-side restaurant

SUBJECT : Iranian Political Situation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, OR, POL, NEA/IRN

Tavakoli contacted me August 20 after a month's lapse since our last conversation. He met with me alone without the other LMI officials who had met with us previously. The purpose of the meeting from his point of view was to present LMI versions of various events of the past month.

The following major points emerged from the meeting: A) LMI has an entirely different perception of reality than most other opposition groups and certainly a totally different perspective than government. This difference is so marked at the present time as to make dialogue between the GOI and the LMI extremely difficult if not impossible. B) Tavakoli said that the nationalist movement in Iran lacks a popular base. The choice is between Islam and communism for the movement must have an ideology. C) The GOI has been consistently provocative with respect to police and military forces around the mosques. "The people" will undoubtedly continue to demonstrate and there may be additional violence. The LMI is predicting that there will be martial law in Tehran by August 23 or 24. (Comment: This seems unlikely).

Recent Events: Tavakoli described the aborted political meeting (reported in Tehran 7022). He indicated that a member of Iranian Committee for Human Rights and Freedom, Eng. Hashem Sabaghian who had arranged for the use of the property where the meeting was held, was picked up by SAVAK on July 22 and remains in the Komite prison in Iran. His family has visited him once and he is in good health. The International League for Human Rights has cabled the Prime Minister in protest of this arrest and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights has protested police action in breaking up the meeting.

Tavakoli jumped on the Shah's August 17 press conference statement that liberty was costing so much as evidence that the Shah will not keep even a minimum promise about democratization. He reviewed recent disturbances in Isfahan and

TELEGRAM

11812
1978 DEC -3 PM 12:30
96
LMI
Pol 12

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET/STADIS/LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7

TAGS:
SUBJECT: SECRET TEHRAN 11812
STADIS
ACTION: LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-4 12-3-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR

SUBJECT: KHOMEINI CONTACT

REF: STATE 303337

POL-5

AMB
DCM
ECON2
PM
NSIA
OR
CRU

SHIR
TABR
ISFA

1. MOHAMMAD TAVASSOLI OF REFTEL IS INDIVIDUAL KNOWN TO US AS MOHAMMAD TAVAKOLI WITH WHOM POLOFF STEMPEL HAS BEEN IN CONTACT REGULARLY SINCE MAY 1978. HE IS NOT RPT NOT A "K'HOMEINI MAN" EXCEPT IN LIMITED SENSE. HE IS A SECOND-ECHELON LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) LEADER BEHIND MORE PROMINENT FIGURES SUCH AS BAZARGAN AND SAHABI WITH WHOM WE HAVE ALSO HAD CONTACTS. LMI IS, OF COURSE, MOST PRO-KHOMEINI GROUP IN OPPOSITIONIST GALAXY.
2. TAVASSOLI WAS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTED TO HAVE DEMONSTRATED TO HIM THAT EMBASSY KNEW WHO HE REALLY WAS. THIS CONTACT IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER SOURCE GAVE US THIS NAME ON HIS

CHARTERED BY
POL: JDS tempel: lab

DATE: 12-3-78

CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY
DCM: CWN: aas

CLARANCES:
POL: GBLambrakis

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

O 141416Z DEC 78
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2213
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12249

CHRG: STATE 12-14-78
 APPRV: DCM:GWNAAS
 DRFTD: POL:JESTEMPEL:LAP
 CLEAR: 1. POL:GBLAMBRAKI:
 2.SRP(DRAFT)
 DISTR: 005-3 AMB DCM
 ECON-2 PM OR
 (10)

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12-14-98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) CR-P
 TAGS: PINS, INT, IR
 SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) VIEWS OF
 RECENT EVENTS

SUMMARY: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SOURCE OFFERED
 LMI VIEW OF TASSUA/ASHURA DEMONSTRATIONS AND CALLED FORCE-
 FULLY ON U.S. TO DUMP SHAH. EMBOFF RESTATED SUPPORT FOR
 COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER SHAH. END SUMMARY.

1. LMI SOURCE TELEPHONED EMBOFF STEMPEL AT HOME EVENING
 DEC 13, PREPARED TO DISGORGE FULL LMI LINE ON RECENT NON-
 VIOLENT TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS DEC 10-11 (TASSUA AND ASHURA).
 SOURCE SAID LMI CROWD COUNT WAS BETWEEN 1 AND 1.5 MILLION
 DEC 10 AND 1.7-2.0 MILLION DEC 11. EMBOFF SUGGESTED THESE
 WERE HIGHER THAN ESTIMATES BY PRESSMEN AND OTHERS WHO
 ATTENDED RALLIES, BUT SOURCE STUCK TO HIS FIGURES.

2. LMI BELIEVED DEMONSTRATIONS WERE A "WALKING REFEREN-
 DUM" AGAINST SHAH. SPIRIT OF PEOPLE WAS TREMENDOUS AND
 UPLIFTING. FACT THAT PARADE WENT OFF PEACEFULLY SHOWED
 WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF SHAH "GAVE UP POWER" OVER PART OF
 TEHRAN AND KEPT HIS TROOPS AND SECURITY PEOPLE OUT OF THE
 WAY. PARADE ALSO SHOWED NATIONAL FRONT COULD ORGANIZE
 GOVERNMENT. SOURCE DESCRIBED THOSE WHO MARCHED AS "TIP OF
 ICEBERG" AND SAID EVENT SHOWED OVERWHELMING SENTIMENT FOR
 GETTING RID OF SHAH. EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT PRO-SHAH EFFORTS
 OF PAST TWO DAYS. SOURCE REPLIED THESE WERE GOVERNMENT
 PROVOCATIONS--IN ISFAHAN GOI TROOPS HAD TURNED VIOLENT AND
 WERE "MASSACRING" PEOPLE. WHENEVER GOI GOT INVOLVED, THERE
 SEEMED TO BE TROUBLE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, SOURCE SAID
 LMI COULD NOT REALLY GIVE ACCURATE FIGURES ON CASUALTIES,
 SINCE SOLDIERS WERE HUNTING DOWN PEOPLE IN THEIR HOME,
 EVEN BY HELICOPTER IF NECESSARY. HE THOUGHT KILLED
 NUMBERED BETWEEN 50 AND 2000, HOWEVER. (NOTE: THIS
 SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEEDS FIGURES REPORTED BY U.S. CONSUL
 ISFAHAN AND APPEARS TO REPRESENT LMI/NATIONAL FRONT (INF)
 PROPAGANDA "FITCH.")

3. SOURCE THEN STATED EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS SHOWED U.S.
 SHOULD FORCE SHAH TO LEAVE. EMBOFF GAVE STANDARD
 DISCLAIMER THAT U.S. HAS THAT POWER OR WANTS TO INTERVENE
 IN IRAN. SOURCE REPLIED "U.S. IS ALWAYS AGAINST PEOPLE.
 FROM VIETNAM TO IRAN." EMBOFF THEN UNLOADED SOMEWHAT
 SHARPLY ON SOURCE, CHALLENGING HIS PROPAGANDISTIC VIEW OF
 EVENTS. EMBOFF THEN REITERATED U.S. POSITION THAT COALI-
 TION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BETTER WAY TO ACHIEVE LMI/INF
 GOALS THAN CONTINUED CONFRONTATION. WHY DIDN'T INF USE

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 471

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/20/1989 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: Mujahiddin Structure and Allegiances

1. C - entire text.
2. During conversation March 19, Ambassador asked Prime Minister Bazargan for his assessment of Mujahiddin structure and loyalties. Bazargan launched into a complicated explanation in French, which was difficult for Ambassador and Pol Counselor to follow, but appeared to say that there had been a split in the Mujahiddin movement three or four years ago, with some of them following strict Marxist line.
3. There was a further split of the main Islamic party later on, which can best be described as hardliners and softliners. These people are distinct from the Fedayeen but generally represent extremist views and have not always supported Bazargan's movement. At the moment, both the Mujahiddin and the Fedayeen say they are supporting the movement but Bazargan indicated he did not put much faith in that.
4. Bazargan noted in passing that the original Fedayeen, who had been involved in the Siakhah uprising, were practically wiped out. Others took up their name and tradition later just as the Mujahiddin picked up

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

Office of the Political Counselor

TELEGRAM

Date Feb 25

Counselor for Consular Affairs

Chris,

As you requested, here are some

suggestions from POL.

C. Hawk
Hawk

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

	Area	No	Stat
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IMB			
NIV			
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TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 30 PM 1355 *JZ*INDICATE
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11757

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652: ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TAGS: SECSTATE WASHDC 11757

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

ACTION: E.O. 11652: GDS


TAGS: PINT, IR, UR

SUBJECT: IRANIAN TUDEH LEADER INTERVIEWED

REF: FBIS LONDON DTG LD 291421Y

1. (REFTEL)

POL-3 FBIS LONDON/REPORTS INTERVIEW WITH IRAN TUDEH LEADER ESKANDARI

AMB UNDER HEADLINE, "IRAN TUDEH LEADER REGRETS NO RESPONSE TO
DCM CALL FOR UNITED FRONT."
ECON2
PMUSICA 2. LOOKS TO US LIKE THIS MIGHT BE SOVIET EFFORT TO DISTANCE
OR THEMSELVES FROM ACCUSATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH KHOMEINI.
CRUSHIR WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S AND EMBASSY MOSCOW'S VIEWS.
TABR
ISFA15/

SULLIVANDRAFTED BY:
POL:JDStempel:labDRAFTING DATE
11-20-78

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
DCM:CMN:asCLEARANCES:
POL:GBLambrakis *GBL*113
CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152 (R)
(Formerly FS 413 (R))
January 1975
Dept. of State

NNNNVV ESB047BRA735
PP RUQMER
DE RUFHNA #5423 2081706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271653Z JUL 79
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1384
INFO RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 7164
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 0794
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9525
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6405
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6633
RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0029
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 25423

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/27/89 (LEGERE, LAURENCE) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, IR, UR
SUBJECT: (C) POLADS DISCUSSION OF IRAN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT JULY 26 POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING, BELGIAN REP SAID BELGIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD REPORT THAT IRANIAN EMBASSY THERE HAD FORWARDED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO BREZHNEV BUT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO LEARN SUBSTANCE OF REPORTED MESSAGE. HE ASKED IF ALLIES HAD INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT.

3. ADDITIONALLY, FRG REP CIRCULATED FOLLOWING PAPER ON SOVIET VIEWS ON IRAN.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW MAY HAVE ON REPORTED KHOMEINI-BREZHNEV MESSAGE.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG PAPER:

A. AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE SOVIET POSITION ON IRAN IS CONTRADICTIONARY AND, ON THE WHOLE, ANYTHING BUT CLEAR. THUS, IT REFLECTS THE UNCERTAIN PERSPECTIVE OF IRAN'S FUTURE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND - DEPENDENT ON THIS - HER FOREIGN-POLICY ORIENTATION. THE INITIALLY - AS IT SEEMED - UNRESERVED SOVIET SYMPATHY FOR THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS INCREASINGLY GIVING WAY TO GREATER CONCERN AT THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT HETEROGENEOUS IRANIAN 'LEADERSHIP' IS NOT OPENING HERSELF TO MOSCOW'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WOOING TO THE EXTENT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED FOR.



THREAT ANALYSIS GROUP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE • OFFICE OF SECURITY

SECRET

THREAT ASSESSMENT: IRAN

Prepared by:
Stefanie C. Stauffer
632-1864

Approved by:
Bowman H. Miller
Sid T. Telford
632-2412

June 14, 1979

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

SECRET

RDS-1,2,4 5/29/2009 (Multiple Sources)

Tribal leader

Khosro Khan Qashqai is the youngest and most virulently anti-Government of the four paramount khans--all brothers--of the Qashqai tribe. Although his oldest brother, Naser, is the tribal chief, Khosro was for many years the war leader and commands considerable respect among his tribesmen. He has three strong passions: a bitter hatred of the Shah, a strong loyalty to his tribe and family, and an ambition to replace the Pahlavi family as rulers of Iran. These motivations outweigh any other friendships or alliances he may form. He has often professed friendship to the US, but has not hesitated to attack US policy in Iran. He once referred to the Shah as an American puppet who is plundering the nation's wealth.



(PRE-1964)

Since 1954, when Khosro and two of his brothers were exiled, he has been involved in innumerable plots and rumors of tribal uprisings. He is closely connected with the National Front (NF) organization in West Germany, where he now lives, although the NF does not consider him a bona fide nationalist. He has been reported to be in contact with the Tudeh (Communist) Party in East Germany, and has urged the NF to cooperate with the Tudeh against their common enemy, the Shah. He is also rumored to be in contact with UAR President Nasir. In 1963 negotiations were being held between the Qashqais and the Government to permit two of the brothers to return; Khosro, however, was not considered.

Khosro Qashqai was born in 1921 in Firuzabad in southern Iran, the main city of the Qashqais. His father, Ismail Khan Qashqai (Solat-ed-Dowleh), was poisoned by order of the Shah in the early years of the Pahlavi dynasty. The hatred of Ismail's sons for the Shah is said to date from this event. Khosro graduated from the American College of Tehran in 1939 and returned to his tribe to assume his hereditary duties. He served as governor of Firuzabad from 1943 to 1947. In addition to being the tribal war commander, Khosro was responsible for the tribe's foreign relations and politics. In 1947 he was sent by the Qashqais to be their deputy in the Majlis. He served in the three consecutive sessions until 1953. Khosro Qashqai was vice president of the 16th Majlis (1950-52), and was a member of the Majlis Agricultural Commission during that session.

The opposition of the Qashqai Khans to the Government has been almost continual since World War II. In that conflict they supported the Germans, and during the 1940's and 1950's led tribal revolts aimed at

<p>GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification</p>

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFICATION
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NQ/FORN

POST
Tehran

DATE
Sept. 9, 1961

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Foreign Service of the United States of America
BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

INSTRUCTIONS

For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.

REPORTING OFFICER
Victor Wolf, Jr.

COPIES TO
GTI, Tehran Bio files

NAME
SHARIAT-MADARI, Seyed Kazem

NATIONALITY
Iranian

PRESENT POSITION
Prominent Shia Senior Cleric

DATA AND REMARKS

Personal: Born about 1894 at Tabris of a clerical family. Presently has one wife. In the Past he had a number of sigh (temporary contract wives), especially during his travels to holy cities in Iraq and Iran. Nothing is known about his children, although he undoubtedly has some.

Education: Began his religious education in Tabris and later studied in Qom. He has also studied at Meshed for a number of years and for short periods of time at Najaf and Kerbala.

Teaching: He is presently one of the four most important Shia clergymen at Qom and is a prominent teacher, specializing in religious jurisprudence. He is presently using some of the tithes which are available to him to construct a "House of Islamic Propagation" in Qom with a branch in Tehran across Avenue Shah Reza from Tehran University. He has also obtained a credit of Rials 50 million (\$667,000) for this project. Students at these "Houses" will be taught modern science and foreign languages as well as regular religious studies. The graduates of this school will reportedly be used as missionaries to proselyte Islam in foreign countries. Some years ago, Shariat-Madari was promoted to the rank of Mujtahid and is considered one of the marjeh (most senior Shia clergymen and one of those contending for the Shia paramountcy). As such, he is considered a pre-eminent clergyman whose religious instructions should be followed and who has the right to command the faithful. He can also legitimately use the title of Ayatollah.

Travels: Iraq

Languages: Persian and Arabic

Political Activities: Shariat-Madari has considerable religious followers in Tabris and Azerbaijan and his political base is in the Tabris bazaar. Reports have estimated that he has perhaps as many as 500,000 followers in Northwestern Iran. He has a secondary base in Qom where he has a particular following among Azerbaijanis studying in that shrine city. Shariat-Madari is considered to be extremely cautious and conservative when it comes to tactics but he is self-possessed, intelligent, and somewhat modernist in his religious outlook (see Political and Social Attitudes).

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downgrading and declassification.

Submit to Department in Triplicate

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

Continue Data and Remarks on Plain Sheet

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

RELIABILITY OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or infrequently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

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Handwritten: Hester
New file

IRAN REPORT NO. _____

RECENT ANTI-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES WITHIN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES IN QOM DATE OF REPORT **5 APRIL 1966**

NO. PAGES _____

REFERENCES _____

MARCH 1966

IRAN, TEHRAN 30 MARCH 1966

NIT-7066

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADING AND DOWNGRADING APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

A SENIOR MULLAH WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN COURT AND RELIGIOUS CIRCLES. HE HAS PROVIDED OCCASIONAL BUT ACCURATE INFORMATION ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES SINCE 1963.

1. ON 17 MARCH 1966 IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS ARRESTED SHEIKH FNU MONTAZERI AND AT LEAST THREE OTHER MULLAHS IN QOM AFTER AN ANTI-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TALK AT WHICH A LEAFLET CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT ON THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS WAS DISTRIBUTED

A. THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH MUSAVI KHOMEINI TO RETURN TO QOM FOR THE NO RUZ HOLIDAYS.

B. THE ATTEMPTS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO ESTABLISH THE SAME CONTROLS OVER THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS THAT IT MAINTAINS OVER THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

C. AN ALLEGED GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL TO GIVE STUDENTS DOLES FROM THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENDOWMENTS OFFICE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRIBE THE STUDENTS TO REFRAIN FROM ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

AS OF 30 MARCH, THE LEARNED SOCIETY OF QOM FORMED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE MAJOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN QOM, WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT AYATOLLAH SEYED AHMAD KHONSARI IN TEHRAN TO REQUEST THAT HE ASK SECURITY AND COURT OFFICIALS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ARRESTED MULLAHS.

2. THE ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAVE ALSO ATTACKED AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI OF QOM. THEY CLAIM THAT THE RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA CENTER, FOUNDED BY SHARIAT-MADARI IN QOM IN 1965, MUST HAVE A SECRET GOVERNMENT

/CONTINUED/

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Cyrus Elahi, Special Assistant to Educational
Minister Ganji
John D. Stempel, U.S. Embassy, Tehran
Barbara Schell, U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: February 6, 1978 - Chetniks Restaurant

SUBJECT : Frustration in the GOI and the Amouzegar
Government

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, BIO
NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Elahi, who has known both Emboffs for over two years, was very critical of Prime Minister Amouzegar's handling of basic educational problems in Iran. Elahi speaks from the perspective of one committed to the political career of his Minister, Manuchehr Ganji, and his remarks should be taken in that light. Elahi is a public participation oriented academic who has frequently expressed frustration with bureaucratic slowness and is one of the idea men on Ganji's team.

Elahi believes Amouzegar vetoed the proposed merger of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Science and higher education had been put under Ganji's tutelage about two months ago with the intention that the ministries eventually would be merged--this is not to be the case). In response to questions, Elahi indicated he did not know why the Prime Minister was against the merger, which Elahi and Ganji believe is the only way to cope successfully with the stresses and strains in Iran's higher education. Such strains are directly related to the inadequacies of Iranian secondary education. The Prime Minister reportedly feels both jobs together are too big for one man. (At a dinner several nights earlier Elahi indicated that Ahmad Qoreshi, Chancellor of National University, was the leading candidate to become the new Minister of Science and Higher Education. Elahi said he will stick with Ganji at the Ministry of Education (implying he had received another offer, perhaps from Qoreishi) because he feels the problems of secondary education are more immediate and solving some of them will have beneficial spillover on higher education within a very few years. Elahi may simply be loyal to Ganji, or uncertain of his own priorities.

The New Amouzegar Government: When the discussion broadened to talk of the Amouzegar government in general, Elahi repeated what is becoming a common theme in many circles--the Amouzegar

AIRGRAM

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A-105

HANDLING INDICATOR

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FC
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L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EO.11652 : XGDS-4

TAGS : PINS, PGOV, IR

FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

DATE: AUGUST 1, 1978

SUBJECT : UNCERTAIN POLITICAL MOOD: RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS,
TOUGHER ROYAL LINE ON DEMONSTRATORS

REF :

SUMMARY: Source who has been helping broker court contacts with religious groups notes official disappointment with recent developments, especially Ayatollah Shariatmadari's refusal to publicly break ranks with Ayatollah Khomeini. Shah's mood and health concern some court officials. According to this source Shah has directed much tougher line against demonstrators in wake of July 26-29 rioting. Corruption could become major political issue. Communist and Khomeini forces are staying in opposition background for moment. GOI seen as still in disarray. Source represents pessimistic view current in several circles, but probably overstates negative aspects of present situation. Support for various elements of his views are found in other quarters as well, however, and Iranian political mood seems roller coaster for the moment. END SUMMARY.

Hedayat Eslaminia, who has been discussing the religious situation with Embassy Political Officers for the past few months, opened a July 25 meeting with Political Officer Stempel in somewhat low spirits. The religious situation has "come apart". Eslaminia learned from General Fardoust and SAVAK Chief Moghaddam that the Shah was most distressed that Ayatollah Shariatmadari did not publicly oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's call for a subdued, "politicized" celebration of 12th Imam's birthday July 21. Eslaminia says Shariatmadari and his supporters have increased their dislike for Khomeini until it borders on hate because pro-Khomeini groups are black mailing Shariatmadari supporters by threatening to shut down or burn their shops in the Bazaar.

SECRET/LIMDIS

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

 In Out

Drafted by:

POL:JDS:ampel:lab

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

CHARGE: CWNaa

TELEGRAM

09904
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09904

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN

E.O. 11652:
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SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEHRAN
EXDIS
NOFORN

09904

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RELIGIOUS DEAL WITH GOI

REF: TEHRAN 9309 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

DCM-2

AMB
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CRU
5/

SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVE OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI (STRONGLY PROTECT) CALLED ON EMBOFF TO ASCERTAIN U.S. POSITION ON PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO INDICATE POTENTIAL DEAL IN OFFING BETWEEN MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HEADED BY SHARIATMADARI AND GOI. DEAL INCLUDES EFFORT TO CONVINCAY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN FRANCE TO "GO EASY" IN OPPOSITION. RELIGIOUS LEADERS PREPARED TO BRING NATIONAL FRONT (INF) POLITICIANS ALONG AS PART OF ARRANGEMENT. NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI, TREASURER OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF), DURING PHONE CALL ON OTHER MATTER, ASKED TO SEE POLOFF STEMPEL CONCERNING "URGENT"

DRAFTED BY: POL:JDStempel:lab DRAFTING DATE: 10-11-78 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:CHNaas

CLEARANCE: POL:GBLambrakis

SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN

OPTIONAL FORM 352(H)
(Formerly FS 413(41))
January 1975
Dept. of State

TELEGRAM

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FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/LIMDIS
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E.O. 11652: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
TAGS: AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

SUBJECT: INFO: USINT BAGHDAD

ACTION: SECRET TEHRAN 10281
LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION ON THE MOVE: DEAL IN THE WIND?

REF: A. TEHRAN 9904 (NOTAL), B. TEHRAN 9892 (NOTAL)

POL-3

SUMMARY: JOINT DELEGATION LEAVES IRAN FOR PARIS OCT 21 TO SEE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. NATIONAL FRONT (INF) SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZE POSSIBILITY OF COALITION, ATTACK GOI FOR CORRUPTION AND CALL FOR "NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESS MORNING OCT 22 REPORTS DEPARTURE OF ENG MEHDI BAZARGAN AND DR. NASSER MINATCHI FROM IRAN FOR PARIS TO "DISCUSS CRITICAL MATTERS" WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAZARGAN, WHO IS HEAD OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) AS WELL AS LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI); AND MINATCHI, WHO IS CDHRF TREASURER AND CLOSE FRIEND OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI, APPEAR TO BE ON POLITICAL CONCILIATION MISSION (SEE

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POL:JDS *ampel:lab*

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10-22-78

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DCM: CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
POL:GBL *Lambrakis*
OR: (info)

SECRET/LIMDIS

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OPTIONAL FORM
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TELEGRAM

1978 NOV 16 AM 8 13

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FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

11652:
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

11228

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

DL: 2

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: KARIM SANJABI
REF: STATE 289279

MB
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DEPUTY MINISTER OF COURT BAHADORI MADE INQUIRIES AT OUR REQUEST YESTERDAY AND INFORMS US SANJABI IS IN COMFORTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE UNDER ARREST. HEAD OF SAVAK GENERAL MOGHADAM, WHO WAS SANJABI'S LAW STUDENT, HAS PERSONALLY INDICATED TO US THE SAME THING. WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS ARREST UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATION SECTION 5 ON NOV 11 WHEN HE WAS ILLEGALLY TRYING TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE.

SULLIVAN

EDITED BY:

GA
POL:GBLambrakis

DRAFTING DATE

11/16/78

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED

MIN:CWN *Naas*

FINANCES:

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1978 NOV 22 PM 1341

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FROM
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CLASSIFICATION
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC **PRIORITY**
11502

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

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دترسیاس نیایشکی حضرت امام
شماره

7

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PINS, IR

SUBJECT: ALI AMINI MOVES

1. BOSTON GLOBE'S STEVE ERLANGER (PROTECT) IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF SAID FORMER PRIME MINISTER ALI AMINI TOLD HIM NOV 20 THAT OPPOSITION WAS COMING TO AGREEMENT ON COALITION GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT NAMING INDIVIDUAL, AMINI SAID CANDIDATE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN CHOSEN WHO HAD BEEN OUT OF POLITICS FOR 15 YEARS BUT WAS A RESPECTED INDIVIDUAL WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE. AMINI SAID HE WAS MEETING WITH BAZAARIS NOV 23 TO DISCUSS SUPPORT FOR SUCH A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IDEA INCLUDED CONCURRENT NAMING OF ADVISORY COUNCIL TO SHAH WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF OLDER OPPOSITION LEADERS, LEAVING ROOM IN PROPOSED CABINET FOR YOUNGER, MORE DYNAMIC OPPOSITIONISTS AS WELL AS SOME INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD SERVED AS UNDERSECRETARIES IN MINISTRIES. AMINI WOULD NAME NO NAMES.

2. IN COURSE OF TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION, AMINI SAID SHAH MUST

E.O. 11652:
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SUBJECT:

ACTION:

POL-3

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PM
USICA
OR
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SHIR
TABR
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DRAFTED BY:

POL:JDStempel:lab

CLEARANCES:

POL:GBLambrakis

DRAFTING DATE

11-22-78

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

DCM: CWNaas

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

1

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

TELEGRAM

1978 DEC -7 PM 12: 30

INDICATE
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FROM
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11969
LIMDIS

ACTION:

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/7/98 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADERS RELEASED; DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED

POL-3

AMB
DCM
ECON2
PM
OR
CRU

11

SUMMARY: GOI RELEASED KARIM SANJABI AND DARIUS FOROUHAR EVENING DEC 6. PAIR WILL MEET WITH FRONT LEADERS DEC 7. NATIONAL FRONT (INF) WILL PARTICIPATE IN DEMONSTRATIONS SCHEDULED FOR DEC 10 (TASSUA). U.S. PROFESSOR COTTAM RUMORED IN IRAN. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI CALLED EMBOFF STEMPEL AT HOME AFTER CURFEW DEC 6 TO DISCUSS NEWS THAT GOI HAD RELEASED KARIM SANJABI AND DARIUS FOROUHAR. MINATCHI CONFIRMED RELEASE AND SAID HE HAD TALKED TO TWO MEN BY TELEPHONE. MEETING OF MAJOR NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS WAS SET FOR LATE AFTERNOON DEC 7 TO DISCUSS NEXT MOVES. MINATCHI NOTED GOI HAD MADE DECISION TO RELEASE PAIR ON DEC 4, AND RELEASE WAS BEING VIEWED AS GESTURE OF GOODWILL, AT LEAST BY MODERATE INF LEADERS. LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) CONTACT TOLD EMBOFF MORNING DEC 7 THAT RELEASE WAS "INTERESTING" BUT DID NOT CHANGE MUCH AND ASKED TO

DRAFTED BY:

JMS
POL:JDStempel:lab

DRAFTING DATE

12-7-78

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY

DCM: CWNaas
C

POL:GBLambrakis *ed*

CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM
(Formerly FS-
Janus)

01154Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEKRC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 2488
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4125
RUFMPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3549
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12601

URGENT: STATE INFO/VA
APPROV: DCNOVUMALS
DRAFT: POL:JST/ST/ST/ST
CLEAR: POL:G/BLM/ST/ST
DISTR: POC-G/AMN/ST/ST
ECOS-G/PW/ST/ST
CROH/16

LINDIS

R.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/28/84 (STYMPXL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS:
SUBJECT: WHITHER OR WITHER SADIQI

REF: (A) TEHRAN 12648, (B) TEHRAN 12652 (NOTAL),

SUMMARY: CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY EXISTS AS TO WHERE SADIQI STANDS IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO FORM GOVERNMENT. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE HE HAS HAD LITTLE LUCK IN GETTING CABINET TOGETHER, BUT STORIES PERSIST, ESPECIALLY IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, THAT HE MAY BE CLOSE TO TAKING THE REINS. SOME OF HIS REPUTED CABINET CHOICES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY THAT THEY WOULD NOT SERVE. EVEN IF SADIQI COULD FORM GOVT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS SERIOUS DOUBT IN MANY QUARTERS IT WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH. IN WAKE OF GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER IN TEHRAN AND GROWING PRESENT AND PROJECTED SHORTAGES OF KEY ITEMS SUCH AS HEATING OIL AND GAS, IT APPEARS TO EMBASSY THAT TIME FOR POLITICS IS VERY SHORT.
END SUMMARY

1. PARA SEVEN REF A SUGGESTS POLITICAL INITIATIVES ARE AT DEAD CENTER FOR MOMENT. PUBLICLY, GHOLAM HOSSEIN SADIQI IS STILL SUPPOSED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO FORM A CABINET TO TAKE OVER FROM SEN. AZHARI'S GOVT. AS A RESULT, AZHARI GOVT IS INCREASINGLY SEEN HERE, EVEN BY ITS OWN MEMBERS, AS A LAME ~~DUCK~~ ADMINISTRATION. ITS MINISTERS ARE LOATH TO TAKE IMPROVISED DECISIONS EVEN ON SIMPLE MATTERS. PRIVATELY, EMBASSY HAS HEARD WIDELY VARYING STORIES, ALL FROM GOOD SOURCES, ABOUT SADIQI PROGRESS. MOST OPTIMISTIC SAY HE HAS CABINET NEARLY FORMED (REF B) AND WILL BE READY TO MOVE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS COINCIDES WITH RUMORS GOING AROUND DEC 27 AND 28 THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW GOVT WILL COME DEC 29-31. EQUALLY GOOD SOURCES, HOWEVER, SAY SADIQI HAS HAD MINIMAL LUCK ENLISTING QUALIFIED PEOPLE (I.E., THOSE NOT "TAINTED" BY PARTICIPATION IN PAST 15 YEARS' GOVERNMENTS) AND HAS BEEN ABLE TO LINE UP ONLY FOUR TO EIGHT INDIVIDUALS.

2. A COUPLE OF HIS REPORTED CABINET CHOICES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY INDICATED EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED IN COALITION GOVT. MOHSEN PIRNESHKPOUR TOLD CLOSED SESSION OF PARLIAMENT DEC 27 THAT YOUNG, UNTAINTED RADICAL GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED. IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONVERSATION INSTIGATED BY US HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS READY TO OFFER HIMSELF AS PRIME MINISTERIAL CANDIDATE, THUS SUGGESTING HE WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN BEING SADIQI'S MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AS HAD BEEN TOUTED. MENEDI

SECRET

18832

30 Dec 78

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OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #7062 3630235
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O 292354Z DEC 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

~~SECRET~~

ACTION:
POL-3
INFO:
AMB
DCM
EC-2
PM
OR
ADM
ICA
ISF
SHIR
TABR
CRU-2
11/GMH

TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4170
RUEHYO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0913
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0578
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4059
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8157
RUTAOL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4091
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5548
RUEBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 6694
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4318
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9391
RUEHQQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2156
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 6802

BT
SECRET STATE 327062

STUTTGART FOR ELG

E.O. 12065: GDS 12/29/84 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 58, 12/29/78

1. TEHRAN WAS QUIETER THIS MORNING THAN IT HAD BEEN FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THE FOCUS TODAY WAS ON THE POLITICAL SCENE WITH THE EMBASSY HEARING FROM A FORMER GOI MINISTER THAT THE AZHARI GOVERNMENT "DEFINITELY WOULD RESIGN DECEMBER 30." ADDITIONALLY, DR. SHAH-POUR BAKHTIAR, NATIONAL FRONT LEADER WITH SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS CREDENTIALS, TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT THE SHAH HAD GIVEN HIM A MANDATE DECEMBER 28 TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE WISHED TO SEE AN EMBASSY OFFICER DECEMBER 30, AND HOPED FOR U.S. SUPPORT. FURTHER, AN AMERICAN PRESS SOURCE REPORTS GREAT ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF ZAHEDI. ALL OF THE INTERLOCUTORS SEEM CERTAIN THE SADIQI EFFORT HAS FAILED.

2. MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS AGREE THAT THE SHAH STILL RETAINS AT LEAST THE POWER TO EFFECT AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A REGENCY COUNCIL WHICH THEY DEMAND. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, A REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD EXERCISE THE SHAH'S

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

O 071100Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2754
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00295

LIMDIS

E.O. 12U65: GDS 1/7/85 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: ANOTHER MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST OPPOSES BAKHTIAR

REF: 78 TEHRAN 127U2

1. HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION AND MODERATE OPPOSITION POLITICIAN MOHAMMAD DERAKHSHESH EXPRESSED TOTAL OPPOSITION TO BAKHTIAR GOVT IN BRIEF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH POL COUNSELOR TODAY, JAN 7. HE DENIED HE HAD EVER BEEN CANDIDATE FOR A POSITION (CONTRARY TO REPORTS EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES LAST WEEK) AND DENIGRATED QUALITY OF MINISTERS. SEVERAL OF HIS GROUP HAD TURNED DOWN OFFERS FROM BAKHTIAR.

2. IF ANY (SUCH AS SAMIMI) ARE MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES, DERAKHSHESH SAID, THEY WERE FORTH RANK UNKNOWN. HE KNEW FOR A FACT THAT NEW MINISTER OF EDUCATION (RIAH) WAS AN ACTIVE SAVAK AGENT; DERAKHSHESH HAD GOTTEN HIM A JOB YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS AN UNEMPLOYED TEACHER. OTHERS IN THIS SUPPOSEDLY "NEW" GOVT WERE WORKING OFFICIALS UP TO RECENTLY AND MEMBERS OF RASTAKHIZ PARTY. THEIR APPOINTMENTS ARE A JOKE.

3. WHEN POL COUNSELOR ASKED WHAT DERAKHSHESH THOUGHT OF SHAH'S PLANS TO TAKE A VACATION, DERAKHSHESH SAID HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED. SHAH HAS TAKEN VACATIONS BEFORE, AND COME BACK. THAT IS NOT THE PERMANET DEPARTURE THAT IS NECESSARY.

4. DERAKHSHESH SAID SHAH IS ALWAYS LATE WITH HIS DECISIONS. BAKHTIAR GOVT WOULD HAVE BEEN ANSWER A YEAR AGO, BUT TOO LATE NOW. COUNTRY'S SICKNESS REQUIRES REAL MEDICINE, NOT ROUND WHITE PILLS. HE AGAIN PUSHED HIS GROUP'S POSITION: SHAH MUST LEAVE SO THAT KHOMEINI LOSES MUCH OF HIS POWER, ALLOWING MODERATES OF THE CENTER TO COME INTO THEIR OWN.

5. DERAKHSHESH'S WEEKLY (ON ITS THIRD ISSUE) ATTACKED BAKHTIAR YESTERDAY. SULLIVAN

BT
#0295

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CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN

O 081243Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2798
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00367

CERGE: STATE 1/8/79
 APPRV: DCM: CWNAAS
 DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL: CCM
 CLEAR: POL: GBLAMBRAKIS
 DISTR: POL: S AMB DCM
 PM ECOM
 CEROW/S

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PINE, PGOV, IR
 SUBJECT: CLERGY ORGANIZING TO HELP STABILIZE PUBLIC ORDER

SUMMARY: DR. NASSER MINATCHI TOLD EMBOFF MORNING JAN 8 THAT NUMBER OF HIS SOURCES INDICATE SHAH'S DEPARTURE IS IMMINENT. IN VIEW OF THIS, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE FORMED ORGANIZATION TO HELP MAINTAIN ORDER THROUGH TRANSITION PERIOD TO NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. STATEMENT HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR CALM. CONCERN REMAINS OVER MILITARY BEHAVIOR. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI INFORMED POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN 8 THAT CLERICAL LEADERS IN TEHRAN HAVE FORMED A NEW GROUP WHICH TRANSLATES AS "CLERGY LEADERS ORGANIZATION (CLO)". PURPOSE OF GROUP WAS TO HELP MAINTAIN SOCIAL ORDER OVER NEXT FEW WEEKS. MINATCHI SAID HIS PARLIAMEN-TARY SOURCES SAID NEW GOI WOULD BE PRESENTED TO MAJLES AND CONFIRMED JAN 9, THEN TO SENATE AND CONFIRMED JAN 10. IT WAS STRONGLY RUMORED THAT THE SHAH WOULD LEAVE THE COUNTRY AT SOME POINT FOLLOWING FINAL CONFIRMATION. CLERGY WERE TO MEET AFTERNOON JAN 8 TO WORK OUT PLANS TO CONTROL EMOTIONAL OUTPOURING WHICH WOULD FOLLOW AND CHANNEL IT CON-STRUCTIVELY IF POSSIBLE.

2. EMBOFF STRONGLY SUPPORTED IDEA, AND NOTED THAT IN EVENT OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE, MILITARY WILL BE VERY EDGY AND BE-HAVIOR IN FIRST HOURS AND DAYS WILL BE CRITICAL. MINATCHI SAID HE COULDN'T AGREE MORE, AND COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDRF) WOULD ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE ALL ITS FOLLOWERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. EMBOFF STRESSED AVOIDANCE OF PROVOCATION WHICH WOULD TRIGGER MILITARY BACKLASH SUCH AS OCCURRED IN QAZVIN AND MASHAD. MINATCHI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PROBLEM VERY WELL.

3. CLERGY WAS ESPECIALLY KEY GROUP, AND CLO WOULD BE MAIN VEHICLE, ACCORDING TO MINATCHI. LEADER WAS HOJATOLLAR SEYED MOHAMMAD BRHESHTI (KNOWN TO EMBASSY AS KEY KHOMEINI LEADER), WITH FOLLOWING OTHER CLERICS AS SENIOR FIGURES: HOJATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI, ABDOLKARIM MOUSSAVI ARDEBILI, AND MOHAMMAD MOFATEH. THEY WERE HOPING TO WORK OUT PLANS JAN 8, THEN BE READY TO MEET WITH AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, WHO WAS EXPECTED IN TEHRAN EVENING JAN 9 OR JAN 10 WITH LATEST SUBTLETIES OF KHOMEINI POSITION.

4. STATEMENT ISSUED IN TEHRAN BY AYATOLLAH TALEQANI JAN 8 WAS ALSO SIGNED BY CLO LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS COM TRIANGLE OF SENIOR AYATOLLAHS. IT CALLED ON PEOPLE TO REMAIN CALM, AVOID INTERFERING WITH SECURITY FORCES, AND CEASE THREATS AND ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS. NOTICE

P 101351Z JAN 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2876

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00502

CHRG: STATE 171/

APPRV: MIN:GWNAAS

TRFTRD: POL:JDSTEMP

CLEAR: POL:GBLAMER

DISTR: POL-3 AMB I

ECON-2 PM I

OR ADM SY D

AFOSI CHRON

E.O. 12065: RFS 1/10/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PINR, IR SEDU

SUBJECT: PROFESSOR'S GROUP TO MOVE FOR UNIVERSITY RE-OPENING

SUMMARY: PROFESSOR'S GROUP WILL TRY TO REOPEN UNIVERSITIES JAN 13. THEY WERE SEEKING PROMISE OF GOVT NON-INTERFERENCE. EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY QUITE RADICAL ABOUT CORRUPTION TRIALS AND BELIEVES BAKHTIAR GOVT MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION TO SURVIVE. END SUMMARY

1. POLOFF SPOKE AT LENGTH JAN 6 WITH PROFESSOR ALI MOHAMMADI, PROFESSOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR AT PARABAD UNIVERSITY IN TEHRAN. MOHAMMADI IS A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF DR. NASSER PAKDAMAN'S SOLIDARITY GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN RUNNING 70 TO 100-MAN SIT IN AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. MOHAMMADI IS IN HIS EARLY 40'S, RECEIVED HIS PH.D. FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND WORKED FOR SOME TIME WITH NIRT (IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION) BEFORE TURNING TO TEACHING A FEW YEARS AGO.

2. MOHAMMADI SAID THERE WILL BE MEETINGS JAN 9 AND 10 BETWEEN PAKDAMAN'S GROUP, UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS AND GOVT OFFICIALS. PURPOSE OF MEETINGS IS TO SET GUIDELINES FOR UNIVERSITY REOPENINGS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE JAN 13 IF ALL GOES WELL. MOHAMMADI SAID FRANKLY THAT UNIVERSITY GROUP DID NOT PARTICULARLY SUPPORT BAKHTIAR'S GOVERNMENT BUT FELT THIS WAS A CHANCE TO GET THE UNIVERSITIES REOPENED AND TURN STUDENTS ATTENTION IN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION. SOLIDARITY GROUPS BASIC GOALS WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN SELECTION OF DEPARTMENT HEADS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS. MOHAMMADI SAID UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS WOULD PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT INSIST ON EXECUTIVE RIGHTS TO APPOINT CHANCELLORS AND VICE CHANCELLORS BUT DEFINITELY WANTED MORE SAY IN THIS PROCESS THAN IRANIAN GOVT HAS EVER PROVIDED BEFORE. (PRESS JAN 10 NOTED SOME UNIVERSITY FACULTY COUNCILS HAVE CALLED FOR UNIVERSITY REOPENING WITHIN A WEEK.)

3. MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IN MOHAMMADI EYES IS QUESTION OF CORRUPTION. HE SAID UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS ARE A MAJOR FORCE BEHIND PRESSURE TO HOLD PUBLIC TRIALS IN ARYAMEHR STADIUM FOR "LIST OF FIFTEEN" MAJOR FIGURES. HE PERSONALLY HOPES JUDICIAL PROCESS WOULD BE FOLLOWED EVEN IN SUCH PUBLIC TRIALS, BUT THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE "PEOPLE HANGING FROM THE LAMP POST WITHIN TWO WEEKS."

4. WITH RESPECT TO BAKHTIAR GOVT, MOHAMMADI SAID SOLIDARITY GROUP THOUGHT SOMETHING USEFUL COULD COME ABOUT IF PRIME MINISTER COULD ACT ON ISSUES OF MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN. HIS SOLIDARITY GROUP SEES BAKHTIAR GOVT AS TRANSITIONAL EFFORT LEADING TO FREE ELECTIONS. PROBLEM IN EYES OF

O 111326Z JAN 78
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2911
 INFO RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1899
 RUJCMG/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4245
 RUEEHR/USINT BAGHDAD 0934
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1279
 RUCMDH/AMCONSUL DHARRAN IMMEDIATE 1999
 RUQMCD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0732
 RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1260
 RUSBQT/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3711
 RUCMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3929
 RUSBLY/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5113
 RUQMTM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0322
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4959
 RUDTIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4192
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1228
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1366
 RUCMYT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0723
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3366
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3624
 RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0252
 RUQMYA/USLC RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0101
 RUFHRC/AMEMBASSY ROME 1260
 RUEEHC/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0900
 LUSNAAA/USCINCEUR WAIHINGEN GE
 RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC
 BT

CHRG: STATE 1-11-79
 AFPEV: DCM:OWAAS
 DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:
 CLFAR: POL:GPIAMBRAKI
 DISTR: POL-2 AMB DCM
 ECOM-2 PM USIC
 CR CRU SHIR
 TARR ISF DAO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 0562

E.O. 12065: RIS-4 1-11-85 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
 TAGS: PGOV, IR
 SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR PRESENTS HIS CABINET; SHAFACAT IS
 DEFENSE MINISTER

REF: (A) TEHRAN 268, (B) 78 TEHRAN 2243.

SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR PRESENTED HIS CABINET
 TO MAJLES MORNING JAN 11. JAFFAR SHAFACAT, FORMER DEPUTY
 SUPREME COMMANDER AND MOST RECENTLY GOVERNOR OF EAST
 AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE WAS NAMED DEFENSE MINISTER. BAKHTIAR'S
 PROGRAM WAS SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS INDICATIONS. MAJLES
 WILL RECONVENE JAN 14 FOR BEGINNING OF DEBATE. SENATE
 PRESENTATION JAN 13. VOTE PROBABLY WILL COME JAN 16 OR 17.
 END SUMMARY.

1. PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR PRESENTED HIS CABINET
 TO PARLIAMENT MORNING JAN 11 AND GAVE SHORT OUTLINE OF HIS
 GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM. CABINET CHOICES WERE AS LISTED REF A,
 EXCEPT FOR REPLACEMENT OF JAM BY LT. GEN. JAFFAR SHAFACAT
 FOR DEFENSE MINISTER. SHAFACAT HAS BEEN GOVERNOR OF EAST
 AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE SINCE SHORTLY FOLLOWING TAPRIZ RIOTS
 IN FEB 1979 (SEE REF B FOR BIO DATA).

2. REPLACEMENT FOR JAM WAS BIGGEST QUESTION MARK IN
 BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT, AND SHAFACAT WAS REPORTEDLY CANDIDATE
 OF THE ACTIVE MILITARY. THOUGH PRINCIPAL OPPOSITIONIST
 CONTACTS UNAVAILABLE FOR COMMENT, IT IS KNOWN THAT OTHERS

TEHRAN 1928

O 071408Z FEB 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3843
 BT
 S E C R E T TEHRAN 01928

CHRG: STATE 2/7/79
 APPRV: MIN: CWNAAS
 EMPTD: POL: DRPATTERSON
 CLEAR: POL: GBLAMBRAKIS
 DISTR: POL 3 AMB MIN
 ECON-2 PM ICA
 CE ADM SY DAO
 AFOSI CERON/15

E.O. 12265: RDS-4 2/7/99 (PATTERSON, D.R.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
 SUBJECT: ALI-ASGAR HAJ-SEYYED-JAVADI SOUGHT FOR ARREST

1. (S) WE HAVE REPORTED IN SITREP ALLEGED ARREST OF HAJ-SEYYED-JAVADI (HSJ). CONTACT OF POLOFF STEMPEL INDICATED THAT HSJ APPARENTLY NOT ARRESTED BUT IN HIDING. ENG. SAHEH BANAFI TOLD POL OFF PATTERSON THAT HE HAD SPOKE TO HSJ NIGHT AFTER SUPPOSED ARREST AND KNOWS THAT HE IS IN HIDING. HSJ IS PROMINENT WRITER, MUCH ADMIRER IN OPPOSITION CIRCLES. WE HAVE REPORTED LAST YEAR ON CONTACT WITH HIM IN CDHRF MEETING AND SEND PACKAGE OF HIS WRITINGS TO DEPT WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT THEY BE TRANSLATED. HSJ HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH UNION OF NATIONAL FRONT FORCES (SEE TEHRAN A-19 OF FEB 1, 1978 RPT 1978) AND WRITER'S MOVEMENT, IN ADDITION TO CDHRF. HE IS AN EXTREMELY SKILLED POLITICAL PAMPHLETEER. HE IS DEFINITELY LEFTIST, ANTI-ZIONIST, AND APPARENTLY ANTI-AMERICAN; HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD ISLAM APPEARS TO BE ONE OF POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE RATHER THAN OF RELIGIOUS ZEAL. THE ARTICLE FOR WHICH HE WAS "ARRESTED" DOES NOT ONCE USE THE WORD ISLAM IN ANY OF ITS FORMS, BUT REFERS ALWAYS TO THE "MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAN" AND THE "GREAT NATIONAL REVOLUTION."

2. (C) THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION WAS PUBLISHED IN ETTELA'AT ON SUNDAY, FEB 4, AND IS TITLED "ANSWER TO MACHINEGUNS!" IT BEARS A SUPRA-HEAD "JUST WHAT IS THE ARMY DEFENDING?" AND A SUB-HEAD "THEY HAVE SENT ME A MESSAGE THAT THEY WILL MACHINEGUN ME FULL OF HOLES, THIS IS MY ANSWER TO THEIR MACHINEGUNS." TONE OF THE ARTICLE IN PERSIAN CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS VIRULENT. ITS CLEAR PURPOSE IS TO DIVIDE "THE GENERALS" FROM THE REST OF THE ARMED FORCES. THEME IS THAT GENERALS HAVE BEEN BLINDLY LOYAL SERVANTS OF THE SHAH AND AS SUCH HAVE MURDERED THE PEOPLE OF IRAN TO TRY TO STOP THE GREAT NATIONAL REVOLUTION. THEY HAVE DONE ALL THIS TO PRESERVE THE PRIVILEGES OF THE DICTATORIAL REGIME AND TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS SO THAT THEY, SHAH AND THEIR FRIENDS CAN CONTINUE USING IRAN AND STEALING ITS WEALTH. THOSE CRIMINAL GENERALS ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO KEEP THE "HONORED AND PATRIOTIC" OFFICERS, NONCOMS AND MEN OF IRAN FROM REALIZING THAT THEY ARE BEING USED TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGES OF CRIMINALS AND THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGNERS RATHER THAN TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF IRAN AND ITS PEOPLE. THE LANGUAGE OF THE ORIGINAL IS EVEN HARSHER THAN THE ABOVE SUMMARY SUGGESTS. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT "THE GENERALS" WERE ANGERED.

128

3. (C) SOME REPORTS HAVE IT THAT JAVADI MIGHT BE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE 159

LIMDIS

GDS 3/1/85 (SULLIVAN, W.H.) OR-M

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MAR
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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WHEN I SPOKE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SANJABI MORNING MARCH 1, HE MENTIONED FACT THAT SHARIAR RO^UNHANI HAD SPOKEN WITH SECRETARY VANCE. HE WANTED US TO KNOW THAT RO^UNHANI DID NOT RPT NOT REPRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS NICE YOUNG MAN WHO WAS SON-IN-LAW OF YAZDI, BUT HAD NO RPT NO OFFICIAL POSITION. U.S. COULD DEAL WITH HIM "OFFICIEUSEMENT" BUT OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WAS CHARGE WHOSE NAME I CAUGHT AS FAG^HEH. HE SAID MORE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE WOULD SOON BE NAMED.

EZK
ABOUR~~IZEN~~

3. I THEN ASKED ABOUT STATUS OF EX-SENATOR ~~ABOUZEN~~, WHO SAID HE WAS LEGAL COUNSEL OF GOI. SANJABI SAID THEY KNEW THE MAN'S NAME, BUT HE HAD NO RPT NO CONNECTION WITH GOI.

4. COMMENT: AS DEPARTMENT WILL GATHER FROM BAZARGAN'S SPEECH LAST NIGHT, HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO WHAT THEY REGARD AS USURPATIONS OF AUTHORITY BY ALL SORTS OF SELF-APPOINTED IRANIAN "AUTHORITIES." I REALIZE THAT YOUNG RO^UNHANI MAY APPEAR TO BE HELPFUL, BUT DEPT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT REGARDS HIS ILK WITH SUSPICION AND RESENTMENT. THIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

1. ~~FOI~~ - see record 10/3/79

2. ~~ICA~~

3. Return B

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Bruce:


Let me give you the flavor of the lunch Peter and I had this week with Agah and Mansour Farhang.

First, the food: austere even by the standard of Shahryar Rouhani. (But I suppose Ambassador Foroughi might have said the same of the hamburger he had with me on the 8th floor.)

Second, Farhang will be a welcome addition to the public relations department of the Embassy. He is quite articulate, smart, a true believer and a self-confessed civil libertarian. He and Agah suggested that we might be helping the Kurds or pleased that the Soviets were crushing the Afghan rebels (because both super powers oppose the Islamic Revolution). But he is sincere in opposing restrictions on the foreign press and to a lesser degree the Tehran press. He has the academic's inclination to criticize while defending. He said he was asked by Behzardnia to defend the PGOI's actions against the press on TV. Farhang said he agreed to appear, but said "I will attack you, for I strongly disagree with your actions."

Farhang has been in California since the early sixties and I suspect his reluctance to take an official position may have something to do with a green card. His two sons' interest in baseball and his wife's distaste for a land without music may also have played a part in his move here.

Sincerely,


Henry Frecht

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS 9/20/85

TELEGRAM

003391

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

FROM	CLASSIFICATION		
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION:	ACTION: USICA WASHDC LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN <u>3391</u> USICA FOR: NEA AND VOA/PN (69) E.O. 12065: N/A SUBJ: EMBOFFS CALL ON IRANIAN MININFO		
ICA 2 AMB DCM CRU 5	1. THURSDAY, MARCH 29, PRESS ATTACHE AND EMBOFF TOMSETH MET WITH MININFO NASSER MINACHI. DISCUSSION COVERED VOA FARSI BROADCASTS REPORTED VTR AND FILM CENSORSHIP, DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND CLANDESTINE SOVIET BROADCASTS TO IRAN. 2. MINACHI EXPRESSED POSITIVE INTEREST IN VOA FARSI WITH QUESTIONS RE TIME AND FREQUENCY. PRESS ATTACHE SAID WILL KEEP MININFO INFORMED OF INAUGURAL BROADCAST AS WELL AS SCHEDULE. MINACHI HOPED VOA FARSI WILL BE ANOTHER MEANS OF ENLIGHTENING IRANIAN PUBLIC ADDING DISPLEASURE WITH BBC, IE, FACTUAL DISTORTION OF RECENT EVENTS IN GUNBAD-E KAVUS. HIS MINISTRY WILL SOON INAUGURATE ENGLISH LANGUAGE BROADCAST DIRECTED TO U.S.		
DRAFTED BY: ICA: IO: BRosen: mn	DRAFTING DATE: 3/29/79	TEL. EXT. 1142	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: Acting PAC: CSnow
CLEARANCES:			

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS 413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

NNNNVV ESAG83BRAC29
PP RUGHNR
DE RUEHC #7795 2848356
NY CCCCC ZH
P 122150Z OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4979
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 867795

002784

CHARGE

POL
ADM
ECON
CMB

FOR CHARGE FROM PRECHT

E.O. 12065: GDS, 18/12/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: OTRA, IR

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL (I.E., NO HOSTILE DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED) AND WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WOULD LIKE FINALLY TO VISIT YOU, ARRIVING ON PAN AM 2 EVENING OF SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, AND DEPARTING MORNING OF OCTOBER 30. I WOULD WANT TO FILL EVERY WAKING MOMENT AND PLACE MYSELF COMPLETELY AT YOUR DISPOSAL FOR ACTIVITIES. OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BE IMPRACTICAL OR UNSUITABLE:

--CALLS ON MINATCHI AND YAZDI WHOM I MET IN PRE-REVOLUTION TIMES. ACCOMPANY YOU ON YOUR INITIAL CALL ON CHAMRAN IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE THAT. SEE SOMEONE, POSSIBLY REZA SADR, ABOUT COMMERCIAL TANGLES AND OUR EFFORTS TO ASSIST WITH SETTLEMENTS.

--WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO CALL ON BEHISTI OR OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS OR ASTUTE OBSERVERS? IF FEASIBLE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SEE SPOKESMEN FOR JEWISH AND BANAI COMMUNITIES. HOW ABOUT A CALL ON LEFT-WING JEWS WHO SUPPORT REVOLUTION?

--SPEND ABOUT TWO DAYS OUTSIDE OF TEHRAN. OPEN TO IDEAS, BUT SUGGEST DRIVE TO ISFAHAN VIA SAVEN, KASHAN, COUPLE OF VILLAGES I KNOW ON FRIDAY; SPEND DAY IN ISFAHAN, RETURN VIA AIR SUNDAY MORNING.

--WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PRIVATE LUNCH WITH OLD FRIEND ALI REZA FARAHMAND AS IN PAST TIMES.

3. WILL BRING ANYTHING I CAN CARRY THAT YOU OR STAFF DESIRE. MARIAN OFFERS TO SHOP FOR ANN SUIFT AND FORMER CLASSMATES. VANCE

BT
#7795



Confidential Attachment

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tehran, Iran

October 15, 1979

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Henry:

I noticed from your MemCon of September 17, 1979, that you have occasional contact with Mahmoud Foroughi. When you next see him I hope you will tell him that Penne and I remember him and his wife most fondly from our days in Kabul.

I agree with you; Foroughi is a real Persian gentleman. I hope you will tell him that is the way I remember him. Tell him also that I hope his family, which includes several children married to Americans, is well and prospering.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,


L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Henry Precht, Esquire,
Director for Iranian Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

CHARGE:LBLAINGEN:EM
10/15/79

AMERICAN EMBASSY

1973 AUG 27 10 12

TEHRAN, IRAN



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99	✓
100	✓

Biographic Report

Mobammad DAUD
President of Afghanistan

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~
~~DATE 10/1/73 BY [unclear]~~
File Afghanistan

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

I. The localized tribal fighting that erupted in the eastern provinces when the pro-Soviet coup group seized power in late April 1978 has since grown into a countrywide insurgency. (S)

A. Faced with the hostility of the great majority of the traditionally independent population, the regime of President Taraki and Prime Minister Amin has no better than an even chance to complete its second year in power. (S)

B. Taraki and Amin will survive only as long as the loyalty of the military, the security service and the ruling party remains intact, ^{The insurgency is} under the heavy ^{daily coming in the form of} pressure being brought to bear by hostile forces. (S)

- The most likely successor regime would be led by, or at least have the backing of leftist military officers. (S) *w. Enghur & Hazraty*
 - Coup plotters might seek Moscow's tacit approval ^{to} seize power would in any case retain strong ties with the Soviet Union. (S)
- The Soviets favor the installation of a more broadly based government as a means of defusing the tribal insurgency. (S)

X - problems with

Dr. H. Taraki X

Yusifzullah Amin X

Dr. Babrak Karmal X

Dr. Saifullah Khan X

Abdullah - Dutt

Dr. M. Djalil

Dr. M. Yaqub

Col. Babram Sakhi - A/F

Lt. Col. Nazam - A/F

Major - ...

Major - ...

Major - ...

Major - ...

SECRET

AmEmbassy TEHRAN

E2-5 ET

ACTION: ECON⁵ INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO.

7592

MAY 11 1978
ACTION

INFO: O R 181130Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7931
AMR / INFO RUSSOD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7198
DCM / RUMHRR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6145
SA BT
POL 2 C O N F I D E N T I A L K A B U L 3885

ECON STATE: FOR REA: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUNDERS
PM / AID: FOR AA/RE: WHEELER
ICA /
CONS E.O. 11652: GDS
CR / TAGS: EAID, AF
ADM SUBJECT: FUTURE OF US AID PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN
GSD REF: STATE 116319

BE 1. SUMMARY: IN OUR VIEW, THE INSTRUCTIONS IN REFTEL CONCERNING
PER OUR AID PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN ARE TOO LIMITED AND TOO INFLEXIBLE
HU A STRATEGY FOR PURSUING OUR INTERESTS HERE.
RSO ALLOWING "THE DUST TO SETTLE" BEFORE ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE
MSG ON AID MATTERS MAY FORECLOSE FUTURE OPTIONS WITH THE NEW REGIME.
TSO WE RECOMMEND AN EARLY PROBING OF THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT'S
INTENTIONS AND PLANS. END SUMMARY

SCRO 2. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
CRO THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT INDEED QUALIFIES AS A "COMMUNIST"
TCU REGIME IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 620 (F) OF THE "FOREIGN
MP ASSISTANCE ACT." THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY
DAQ REJECTED THAT LABEL -- AND, FOR THAT MATTER, HAS NOT YET
MAAG EVEN USED THE WORD "SOCIALIST" IN ANY OF ITS PUBLIC
AGR ANNOUNCEMENTS OR CONVERSATIONS WITH US. THE MAJORITY
DEA OF THE NEW REGIME'S LEADERSHIP INDEED POSSESS WHAT COULD
IRS BE DESCRIBED AS A "COMMUNIST" PARTY BACKGROUND (ALTHOUGH
TCTR THE NAME "COMMUNIST" HAS NEVER BEEN USED BY ANY OF THE
CEOC AFGHAN LEFTIST PARTIES). THE NEW LEADERSHIP UNDENIABLY
CEOR CAME TO POWER THROUGH VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED, BUT THEY
CRU / WOULD CLAIM THAT THAT WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW
THE "TYRANNICAL DICTATORSHIP" OF DAUD. WE BELIEVE THE
TRUE INTENTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT MAY NOT
BE DISCEJNIBLE FOR SOME TIME.

SHIB / 3. THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR PUBLICLY --
TARR AND TO ME PERSONALLY -- THAT IT WANTS AID FROM ANY AND ALL
ISFA SOURCES, INCLUDING THE US, AND, IN THE NONALIGNED CONTEXT,
FAA WILL BE JUDGING THE "FRIENDLINESS" OF FOREIGN NATIONS
IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND ECONOMIC AID.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SEE NO POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE TO OUR APPEARING TO BE UNDULY STANDOFFISH OR
NEGATIVE/ SUCH A STANCE COULD IMPEL THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME
TO BECOME TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON -- AND ALIGNED WITH THE
USSR, A LA CUBA. BY WAITING TOO LONG, WE RISK CAUSING

15
1

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

178 SEP 26 AM 8:02

E-2-5

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO 09279

E.O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: ACTION: POL:3 AMB DCM ECON-2 P/M ICA OR CRU SHIR TABR ISF	FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA AMEMBASSY DACCA AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD AMEMBASSY JIDDA AMEMBASSY KABUL AMEMBASSY MOSCOW AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI USLO PEKING CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN LIMDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: EAID, PEPR, AF IR, US SUBJ: IRANIAN ASSESSMENT OF AFGHAN DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS REF: STATE 240411 1. ADDRESSEES AWARE THAT SHAH HAS VIRTUALLY FROM THE FIRST HELD PRIVATE VIEW OF NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AS FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES A SERVANT OF THE SOVIETS. HE HAS DISGUISED THIS VIEW BEHIND AN OFFICIAL POLICY OF "WAIT-AND-SEE", GIVING THE NEW GOA EVERY BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. FORMAL RELATIONS HAVE CONTINUED AS BEFORE, INCLUDING CONTINUING DISBURSEMENTS ON EXISTING ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS (TEHRAN 7818 AND MEMORANDUM TO DEPT AND KABUL	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL 09279 RF	
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DRAFTED BY: POL:GBLambakis	DRAFTING DATE 9/25/78	TEL. EXT. 1110	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:CMNaas
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CLEARANCES: ECON:JMiller

CONFIDENTIAL
 OPTIONAL FORM 152 (4)
 (Formerly FS-413 (H))
 January 1974
 Dept. of State

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 516 RUEHC
 AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 26 RUSBLK
 INFO: AMEMEAASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 22 RUSBRD
 AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 34 RUOTC
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 32 RUEHMO
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 16 RUSBAE

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/25/89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, PEPR, AF, IR

SUBJECT: Situation in Afghanistan

1. C - entire text.
2. Sultan Mahmud-Ghazi, member of Afghan royal family, former president of Afghan Civil Aviation and Tourism Authority, and brother of former Afghan Ambassador to Iran, visited Pol Counselor March 25 in connection with visa problem. He said he does not have extensive information on situation in Afghanistan, but had talked with people who have come from there as recently as three days ago.
3. He said rebellion is widespread and affects at least eight provinces. Afghan government has no confidence in most of its army, particularly the conscripts, and there have been cases of military units being bombed by the Air Force because they were believed to be untrustworthy. In Kabul security at night is carried out by many civilians and other Communists rather than the military. Indeed, the military are being kept out of the city to a great extent.
4. If the Afghan government had to stand alone, it would not last "for more than a week", according to Mahmud-Ghazi.

OK
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VV ESAB7EBRAG71

24 MAY 79 17 40 Z

FP RUEHNR
 DE RUEHKO #3863/P1 1441319
 ZNY 58555 ZZH
 P 241253Z MAY 79
 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6621
 INFO RUOMQU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0974
 RUEHAD/USINTI BAHADAD 0355
 RUKJPC/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1974
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 7816
 RUMJGN/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0968
 RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 7352
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1076
 RUMHCA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUSBDQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0961
 RUCMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1438
 RUEBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0586
 RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0211
 RUFHLC/AXCONSUL LENINGRAD 5879
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7454
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1440
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7487
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 9248
 RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2144
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3577
 RUFHJA/USMISSION USBERLIN 4714
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USHATO 6966
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USNYN NEW YORK 7833
 BT

POL ROUTING	
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POL
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 RF
 CHRON

SECRET SECTION, 4 OF 13 MOSCOW 15083

E.O. 12865: RDS-3 5/21/99 (TOON, MALCOLM) OR-M
 TAGS: AF, UR, MOPS, PFPR, PINT
 SUBJECT: (C) AFGHANISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION

REF: (A) KABUL 3626, (B) MOSCOW 8584

1. (C) SUMMARY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES VIEWS ITS OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AS OPEN-ENDED. IN OUR OPINION, ANALOGIES WITH THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE FAULTY. WE THINK THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE THEIR ADVISORY AND LOGISTICAL MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE PRO-SOVIET KABUL REGIME. SOME SOVIET PERSONNEL MAY BECOME INVOLVED IN DRA MILITARY OPERATIONS. UNDER FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY AVOID SHOULDERING A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE ANTI-INSURGENCY COMBAT BURDEN IN AFGHANISTAN. END SUMMARY.

6 Aug 79 17 43z

246 for rel Afghan

ZZ SWVV ESA923MJC309
OO RUQMHR
DE RUSBLK #5967/1 2181035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 061012Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5085
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 658
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9123
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1724
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 7192
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1799
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 375
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 4308
RUHQHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RUSNAAA/CINCEUR PRIORITY
RUFKNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 21
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 5967

CN ~~007~~ 246

POL
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NOFORN

DEPT. ALSO FOR: A/SY/CC

KARACHI: FOR RSS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8-5-85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-P
TAGS: ASEC, PINS, AF, PK, IR
SUBJECT: (LOU) AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF THE BALA HISSAR MUTINY

REF: KABUL 5942

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: KABUL WAS AGAIN CALM ON AUGUST 6, FOLLOWING SEVERE FIGHTING THE PREVIOUS DAY BETWEEN MUTINOUS AFGHAN TROOPS AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE KHALQI REGIME. AFTER RESTORING ORDER, THE LATTER CLAIMED THAT THE TROUBLE HAD BEEN CAUSED BY "THE AGENTS OF PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN REACTION." THIS WAS AMONG THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGES THE KHALQI REGIME HAS YET FACED -- AND IT SHOWED ITSELF CAPABLE OF HANDLING IT. HOWEVER, THE EPIISODE FORESHADOWED GROWING PROBLEMS FOR THE KHALQI REGIME AND ITS SOVIET MENTORS. END OF SUMMARY.

ZMITPVV ESA032MJC897
OO RUQMHR
DE RUSSLK #6016/1 2191230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 071223Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5115
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 692
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9133
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1728
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1894
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7292
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 388
BT
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 6016

296
CHG
EXDIS
CHG
CN 290
CHG
CHRON

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/7/85 (AMSTUTZ, J. BRUCE) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, AF, US, PINR
SUBJ: MY MEETING WITH THE NEW AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER DR.
SHAH WALI

REF: STATE 201375

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. LATE YESTERDAY, I PAID A COURTESY CALL ON DR. SHAH WALI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. I HANDED HIM SECRETARY VANCE'S LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS, AND IN RESPONSE SHAH WALI ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS THANKS FOR IT. HE ALSO ASKED THAT I INFORM THE DEPT THAT AFGHANISTAN IS DESIROUS OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., THAT IT DOES NOT SEE ITSELF AS A THREAT TO AMERICA, AND THAT HE WAS SURE THE U.S. COULD NOT BE AGAINST THE DRA'S BASIC SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT "UNFRIENDLY AND DISTORTED" VOA AND AMERICAN PRESS COVERAGE OF AFGHANISTAN, BUT DID NOT DWELL ON THIS. DURING THE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR DUBS' DEATH CAME UP AND I BRIEFED HIM ON HIS GOVT'S LACK OF COOPERATION WITH US IN TRYING TO CLEAR UP SOME OF THE MYSTERIES OF THE AFFAIR. RE THE DRA'S DEMAND THAT WE REDUCE THE SIZE OF OUR MISSION, I DECIDED THIS WAS NOT THE OCCASION TO RAISE IT AND HE DID NOT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEAVES TODAY FOR A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO BULGARIA.
END SUMMARY.

MNNVV FSB090MJC677
RR RUQMR
DE RUSBQD #9324 2281145
ZNY CCCCC ZZB
R 161030Z AUG 79
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 526
RUSBL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 646
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 961
RUSBR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 599
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 895
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 186
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 879

CN 704

POL
CMG
CHRON
ECN
RF

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 8199

E.O. 12865: RDS-4 08/16/99 (ARCHARD, D.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, PINS, AF, PK
SUBJECT: (C) REBELS DENY "SHADOW CABINET" RUMORS

REF: KABUL 6823, (B) PESHAWAR

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THREE AFGHAN REBEL REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM I HAVE TALKED HAVE DENIED THAT A REBEL "SHADOW CABINET" COMPOSED OF TOP DISSIDENT LEADERS HAS BEEN ORGANIZED. DENIALS CONTRADICT RUMORS FROM KABUL SOURCES WHICH WERE REPORTEDLY BASED ON BROADCASTS FROM REBELS' RADIO ASMAR.

3. I TALKED WITH HASSAN GAILANI, NEPHEW AND CONFIDANT OF SYED ARMED GAILANI, ON AUGUST 18. AMCIT ZIA NASSERY ON THE 11TH, AND HIZB-ISLAMI, AFGHANISTAN, NUMBER TWO LEADER AMINULLAH ON THE 14TH. ALL CONSIDER ANY DISSIDENT PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OR "SHADOW CABINET" MADE UP MOSTLY OF PESHAWAR-BASED LEADERS AS UNWORKABLE. NASSERY LIKENED SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO "PUTTING FIVE DIFFERENT ANIMALS IN THE SAME CAGE;" GAILANI'S THOUGHTS WERE EXPRESSED ALONG SIMILAR LINES. AMINULLAH, WHO TOOK USUAL HIZB APPROACH OF DENIGRATING THE OTHER GROUPS, SAID HIZB WOULD NOT JOIN SUCH A COALITION.

4. CLEARLY, THE LONG-STANDING ANTAGONISMS AMONG THE BASIC REBEL FACTIONS HAVE NOT DIMINISHED. EACH TIME I TALK WITH DISSIDENTS, A PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION IS SPENT IN DAMNING THE COMPETITION. MOST RECENTLY, INTER-GROUP HOSTILITY WAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED TO ME AT THE HOTEL KHYBER INTERCONTINENTAL SWIMMING POOL; WHILE MY FAMILY SWAM, I SAT AND CHATTED WITH NASSERY AND AN AFGHAN TRIBAL FIGURE, HASSAN GAILANI, AN ERSTWHILE FRIEND AND

NNNNVV ESA419MJC362
RR RUGMHR
DE RUSBLK #6309 2320925
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 200823Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5284
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBSSY BEIJING 688
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9190
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1758
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1836
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7265
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 409
RUFHEB/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 36
BT
S E C R E T KABUL 6309
EXDIS

E X D I S

CN 814

RWK
CHG
CHRON

E.O. 12065: RDS-A 8-20-99 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, PINS, AF, GE
SUBJ: (C) EAST GERMAN AMBASSADOR DEPARTS KABUL SCENE

1. (C) ON AUGUST 16, DR. HERMANN SCHWIESAU WAS EVACUATED FROM KABUL TO EAST BERLIN FOR EMERGENCY TREATMENT OF WHAT HIS EMBASSY OFFICERS DESCRIBED AS THREE SERIOUS FRACTURES IN HIS LOWER LEFT LEG. SCHWIESAU WAS TAKEN BY AMBULANCE TO BE PLACED DIRECTLY ABOARD AN AEROFLOT FLIGHT; THUS HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WERE DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BID HIM FAREWELL. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HIS TREATMENT IN THE GDR WILL TAKE "AT LEAST SIX MONTHS."

2. (S) ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 12, WHILE SCHWIESAU AND THE A/DCM WERE DEPARTING A PARTY TOGETHER -- SHORTLY BEFORE THE CURFEW, THE EAST GERMAN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SEE THE LATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT AN URGENT MATTER. THE A/DCM REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CALL HIM THE NEXT DAY TO ARRANGE A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME. WHEN THE A/DCM CALLED THE EAST GERMAN EMBASSY ON AUGUST 13, HE WAS TOLD THAT SCHWIESAU HAD BROKEN HIS LEG IN A HOUSEHOLD ACCIDENT THE PRECEDING EVENING AND COULD NOT RECEIVE VISITORS.

3. (S) COMMENT: SCHWIESAU WILL BE MISSED IN KABUL'S DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. EITHER OPERATING ON HIS OWN -- OR, MORE PROBABLY, AT SOVIET DIRECTION, HE KEPT HIS WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD COLLEAGUES "INFORMED" ABOUT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN INSURRECTION.
AMSTUTZ

BT
#6309

2/18 - Ann - Assume
POL - Ann - Assume
Pam will pass this up
001745 from here
Let me know. BL

NNNNVV KSB013BRI452
OO RUQMER
DE RUEHC #1749 2571929
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 1849
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2833
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7114
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1832
RUERMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5428

POL
CHARGE! POL
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RF
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BT
STATE 241749

LIMDIS

Gozdi
Who is the story?

REF: 120851GDS 89/14/85 (COON, JANE A.) NEA

TAGS: PEPR, PINR, AF, UR, US, IR

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN WITH PGOI

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE WITH THE PAKISTANIS. WE THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A SIMILAR DIALOGUE WITH THE IRANIS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS DIALOGUE SHOULD FLOW NATURALLY FROM PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS PNEASSY HAS HAD WITH PGOI.

Please get attached on 9.18.79

3. THE RECENT KABUL WRAPUPS (REF: [unclear]) INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET AND U.S. INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN IS INCREASING. PROVIDE [unclear] TO THE [unclear] TO ASSISTING THE [unclear] TO [unclear] THE [unclear] TO [unclear]

-- WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS HAS RECENTLY GROWN AND DELIVERIES OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP. YOU MAY DRAW FROM FIGURES IN KABUL 6897 BUT SHOULD STRESS [unclear] ARE ROUGH ESTIMATES.

-- WE WOULD REGARD USE OF SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE REGION AND FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

4. PLEASE KEEP US ADVISED OF PGOI VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. VANCE

BT
#1749

NR 1 312115Z AUG 79 STAFF

INFO/LOS ANGELES 20981 SECTION 1 OF 2 (R) GROUP ACTING

KABUL DIRECTOR INFO FRANKFURT GERMANY ISLAMABAD ROM

NYTEL REPEAT AJAJA FORRES 595WIRL W/MOLD DELABEL EPLSERTC

REF: A. DIRECTOR 584525
B. ISLAMABAD 49289
C. KABUL 24591
D. KABUL 24598
E.ROME 77466

1. A COB INTRODUCED BASE OFFICER ABRAMONTE TO DELABEL
L/1) EVENING 30 AUGUST. IN OVER-1-HOUR MEETING BASE DET
FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH
MOVEMENTS. ALSO OBTAINED RECORDED CASSETTE TAPE WITH
AMBASSADOR DUBS' MURDER STORY WHICH IS AT VERY LITTLE VA
THE PAPA 1E AND 1F OF WASHINGTON 499386 (NOT SENT ALL A
SEE SUMMARY BELOW. OBTAINED PHOTOGRAPH OF PRESENT KABUL
CHIEF LAL MOHAMED AND AMB OFFICER MAJOR Q AND I
DESCRIBED AS SUPPORTER OF ABDUL WALI. TAPE AND PHOTOGR
BY HOUSELD HQS.

2. SUMMARY DUBS' ASSASSINATION: KABUL CHIEF OF POLICE
AIR FORCE COLONEL AND TWO OF HIS ASSISTANTS (AMES MEN
ON CASE) WERE INVITED TO L/1'S HOME. LAL MOHAMED DEPART
SECURELY LEAVING HIS TWO SUBORDINATES WHO PROCEEDED TO
INTOXICATED. THESE TWO MEN ARE THE SOURCE OF L/1'S ST
THEY WERE ASSIGNED TO FIRE MACHINE GUNS FOR APPROXIMATE
TWENTY SECONDS INTO THE HOTEL ROOM WHERE AMBASSADOR D
WAS BEING HELD BEFORE LAL MOHAMED AND SOME OTHER POLICE
OFFICERS WERE TO STORM THE ROOM. L/1 WAS NOT SURE HOW
TIMING OF THESE EVENTS TOOK PLACE, BUT APPARENTLY EVERY
WENT OFF ON SCHEDULE. THE TWO MEN OPENED FIRE ON THE
FROM THE ROOF OF THE BANK ACROSS THE STREET AND AS SOON
THEY CEASED FIRING THE DOOR WAS FORCED BY THE LAL MO
PART. AMBASSADOR DUBS WAS, ACCORDING TO THESE TWO

29 SEP 79 1713Z

S E R E T 281324Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE NEW DELHI 51273

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, KABUL, TEHRAN, JDD, KARACAI, Dacca, COLOMBO, LONDON, KATEMANDU, BONN, GERMANY COPENHAGEN.

FMINTEL LWSHELL QRCOBBLE GECARRION QRMSTIC

REF: A. NEW DELHI 51255 (SENT DIRECTOR, ISLAMABAD, KABUL ONLY)
 B. DIRECTOR 508012 (SENT NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KABUL ONLY)
 AFTERNOON 28 SEPTEMBER "ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF PATRIOTIC
 STUDENTS IN INDIA" (IAPASII) MOUNTED A NOISY DEMONSTRATION
 IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI PROTESTING SOVIET
 INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. (THE AFGHAN STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO
 PRESENT SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICERS WITH AN OPEN LETTER TO SOVIET
 PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV. THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE
 LETTER. THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS FUNDED BY NEW DELHI STATION AND
 ORGANIZED AT STATION BEHEST BY UNILATERAL ASSET GECARRION/1 (G/1),
 IAPASII OFFICER. QRMSTIC WROTE THE OPEN LETTER TO THE
 SOVIET PRESIDENT. THE FACT THAT THE DEMONSTRATION WAS TO TAKE
 PLACE WAS EXTENSIVELY REPORTED IN NEW DELHI NEWSPAPERS THE
 PREVIOUS DAY (REF A). THE DEMONSTRATION ITSELF WAS
 COVERED BY INDIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTERS AND FILMED BY INDIAN
 TELEVISION. STATION ANTICIPATES GOOD COVERAGE OF THE EVENT ON
 NEWS TONIGHT (28 SEPTEMBER) AND IN THE PAPERS TOMORROW MORN-
 ING. STATION ATTEMPTING THROUGH ICA TO OBTAIN STILL PHOTOS AND
 FILM OF THE DEMONSTRATION FOR POSSIBLE REPLAY ELSEWHERE. ANY
 INFO ADDRESSES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CAN DO TO REPLAY
 POLICY GIVEN THE DEMONSTRATION IN NEW DELHI WILL BE APPRECIAT-

2. DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, TEHRAN, COPENHAGEN: AN IAPASII
 MESSENGER TOLD THE PRESS THAT SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE SCHEDULED
 TO TAKE PLACE 29 SEPTEMBER IN THE U.S., GERMANY, ITALY AND
 SWEDEN. PLEASE ADVISE IF THEY IN FACT DID.

3. FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM TEXTS OF REPORTS WHICH WERE MOVED ON

27 OCT 79 13 00

SECRET 021254Z OCT 79 STAFF
CITE COPENHAGEN 2887

TO: NEW DELHI INFO DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, IS AM
UNINTEL LNSHELD OR COBBLE GECARRION GAMBIC
REF: NEW DELHI 01273

1. STATION N EMBASSY, AND LIAISON HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF "IAPAST" OR ANY DEMONSTRATION HELD IN COPENHAGEN 5 OCT OF
SECRET FILE: 288-124-179-3; 281-958561. UNV20CT99. BY D9C.1.

3 OCT 1979 15 38 Z

C R T 28 1832Z OCT 79 STAFF

OTZ NEW DELHI 51298

TO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE ISL/HEAD, KEBIL, KENRAA, JINDA, KHARACHI, DACCA, COLOMBO, LONDON, MAHARANO, BOB, GERMANY, COENRAC.

MMNTEL WENELI (COBBLE) RECAPTION CRUYSTIC

REF: A. DIRECTOR 524448
B. NEW DELHI 51275

1. MORNING 25 SEPTEMBER FOUR OUT OF FIVE NEW DELHI DAILY NEWSPAPERS CARRIED COVERAGE OF REF B AFGHAN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON SIDE SOVIET EMBASSY (PRO-SOVIET PRESS NOT AS THE EXCEPTION). "STATESMAN" AND "INDIAN EXPRESS" CARRIED PHOTOS OF DEMONSTRATING AFGHAN AND INDIAN STUDENTS HOISTING BANNERS AND BANNERS.

2. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF REPRESENTATIVE ARTICLE FROM "TIMES OF INDIA": "AFGHAN STUDENTS HOLD RALLY IN FRONT OF SOVIET EMBASSY - BY A STAFF REPORTER - NEW DELHI 25 SEPTEMBER 25. A GROUP OF AFGHAN STUDENTS TODAY HELD A DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN CHAKRAYAPURI TO PROTEST AGAINST SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE "KHALD" REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN. THERE WERE SOME INDIAN STUDENTS ALSO AMONG THE DEMONSTRATORS.

3. "HARSHING FROM TEEN AGES, THE STUDENTS CHANTED SLUGS LIKE "WE WANT JUSTICE", "DOWN WITH THE KGB", "DURAN HO AKBA" TWO STUDENTS CARRYING A BANNER WITH THE LEGEND "GOD IS ONE AND MUHAMMAD IS HIS PROPHET" IN PERSIAN FORMER THE VANGUARD.

4. "LATER THE STUDENTS TRIED TO HAND OVER A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV BY THE "ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL AFGHAN STUDENTS." AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL SAID THEY COULD SEND THE LETTER THROUGH THE AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY.

5. "THE MEMORANDUM NOTED THAT AFGHAN STUDENTS AND THE RUSS HAD LIVED IN PEACEFUL NEIGHBOURS FOR 60 YEARS CELEBRATING TOGETHER."

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--XINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON
COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/CHINA
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION OF AFGHAN SITUATION DURING THE VISIT OF
A CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION TO PAKISTAN
(DOI: 20*29 OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A GENERALLY RELIABLE PAKISTANI FIELD GRADE OFFICER WHOSE
PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

1. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH A CONFIDANT ON 27 OCTOBER
1979, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (DMO) BRIGADIER MIAN MOHAMMAD
A F Z A I SAID THAT DURING THE 12 DAY VISIT (20-29 OCTOBER) OF A
CHINESE "MILITARY GOODWILL DELEGATION" HEADED BY ZHANG CAIQIAN,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF (CGS) OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION
ARMY, THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. THESE
DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED A BRIEFING BY SENIOR PAK MILITARY OFFICERS AND
ATTENDED BY GENERAL Z I A UL-HAQ ON THE INSURGENCY, BEING CONDUCTED
AGAINST THE AFGHAN REGIME BY MUSLIM INSURGENTS.

2. AT ONE POINT IN THE DISCUSSIONS DEPUTY CGS ZHANG CAIQIAN
COMMENTED THAT IF THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS DID NOT RECEIVE SUFFICIENT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT, THE REGIME OF AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAFIZULLAH AMJIN
WOULD BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION AND THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE
TO FURTHER INSTABILITY AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGIME. THIS
STATEMENT PROMPTED GENERAL ZIA TO ASK WHY THE CHINESE WERE NOT
SUPPORTING THE MUSLIM INSURGENTS IF THEY (THE CHINESE) WERE DISTURBED
ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. ZHANG CAIQIAN REPLIED THAT
WHILE SYMPATHETIC TO THE INSURGENT CAUSE, THE CHINESE COULD
NOT PROVIDE AID TO THE INSURGENTS BECAUSE SHOULD THIS BE DISCOVERED
IT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AND WOULD
AFFECT THE TALKS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION CURRENTLY
BEING HELD IN MOSCOW. TO PROTECT THE CHINESE POSITION, ZHANG
CAIQIAN REITERATED AN EARLIER REQUEST MADE BY THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR
IN ISLAMABAD THAT NO CHINESE ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN THE PAKISTAN
ARMY INVENTORY SHOULD BE SUPPLIED TO THE AFGHAN MUSLIM INSURGENTS.
(FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDFIRDS-31/15822-79, DATED 18 SEPTEMBER 1979,
FROM THE SAME SOURCE, WHICH REPORTED GENERAL ZIA'S ORDER THAT NO
WEAPONS, AMMUNITION OR OTHER SUPPLIES OF CHINESE ORIGIN SHOULD BE
SUPPLIED TO AFGHAN INSURGENTS WHO ARE BEING COVERTLY SUPPLIED BY
THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

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SECRET
MILITARY DELEGATION FROM
28 OCTOBER 1979

1. A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE
IDENTITY HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED
BY SOURCE L O V S K I T WHICH WAS RE-
CEIVED IN KABUL FROM THE NATIONAL AIRPORT BY SPECIAL
IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY LISTED SOVIET GENERALS
GENERAL A K I M C H I E V WAS A MEMBER OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
ON 21 OCTOBER AT THE CHELSEOTON PALACE. THE DINNER
WAS HOSTED BY COL. YACOB, CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUSLY LISTED SOVIET GENERALS
GENERAL A K I M C H I E V WAS A MEMBER OF
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
ON 21 OCTOBER AT THE CHELSEOTON PALACE. THE DINNER
WAS HOSTED BY COL. YACOB, CHIEF OF STAFF.

3. AFGHANISTAN, KABUL (2 NOVEMBER 1979).
KLD REPORT NO. NAF-6236.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMERGENCY AND BERT AT KABUL. SENT TO
VDOH, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KARACHI, TEHRAN, JIDDA,
CHU, CINCOSAC, CINCPAC, COMSOUTHFLT, COMINASTOR,
FAIMED, CINCSCAC, CINCPAC, CSO, IPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, USNMBE
PE FOR GENERAL MOORE.
PORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS -
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOR OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS -
REMIATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
INATOR. INW 3W0009 DEY DDC-1 BY RECORDS REPORTING
CEN. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF
ALL DOCUMENT.

78-10

REPORT CLASS SECRET WHINTEL/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT DISSEMINATION

CON

COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/USSR

SUBJECT: INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN PUL-I-CHARKI

SUBJ.

(DOI: SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYE... IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE. HE ACQUIRED INFORMATION FROM AN AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICER AND PARAS FIVE AND SIX FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION.

HO

ARY

1. AT PUL-I-CHARKI MILITARY GARRISON IN THE... RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING TANK DRIVERS, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET INSTRUCTORS HAS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 18 IN LATE... TO BETWEEN 80-100 AS OF LATE OCTOBER 1979. (SOURCE COMMENT: SUB-SOURCE DOES NOT HAVE FREE ACCESS TO THE OTHER... GARRISONS OF PUL-I-CHARKI BUT STATES IT IS HIS IMPRESSION GAINED FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER AFGHAN OFFICERS THAT NUMBER OF SOVIETS ASSIGNED TO OTHER AREAS OF THE GARRISON HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY.

CON

SOVIET

COMMENT

MILITARY

THAT

GARRISON

2. AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI GARRISON, THERE ARE... ABOUT 200 TANKS, ALL IN OPERATING CONDITION. THESE TANKS WERE TAKEN FROM INSIDE THE SHEDS AT THE GARRISON, WHERE THEY WERE STORED ON THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET ADVISERS. THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT AN ATTACK ON THE SHEDS WOULD INCAPACITATE THE TANKS. THERE HAS NOT BEEN A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS AT THE FACILITY.

VTLY

TANKS

THEY

THE

WOULD

WIC

3. PRESENTLY THERE ARE 500 AFGHAN INSTRUCTORS... GOING TANK TRAINING AT PUL-I-CHARKI. THEY RANGE... (SUB-SOURCE COMMENT: THEIR CURRENT LEVEL OF COM... NOT ALLOW THEM TO OPERATE THE TANKS AT PUL-I-CHARKI.

RT

WAGY

NCE

WIC

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: SUB-SOURCE STATES... THE RUSSIANS (SOVIETS) HAVE TAKEN COMMAND OF PUL-I-CHARKI.

LY.

HARKI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ARRESTS OF PRO-TARAKI MILITARY OFFICERS

(OCTOBER 1990)

LEVEL SPECIAL MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE
HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.
AND THIS INFORMATION FROM SENIOR OFFICERS
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

NOTE THE FOLLOWING PRO-TARAKI SENIOR
OFFICERS:

1. MAJOR ABUJULLAH BAYAN, MEMBER OF THE
COUNCIL, CHIEF OF SIGNALS. HE WAS REPLACED
BY MAJOR VADUR.

2. MAJOR GUL HADAN I S R M A T I,
TRAINING INSPECTION. GUL HADAN IS CURRENTLY IN
MAJOR AHMAD ASLAM W A T A M L A E. THEY ARE BOTH
IN DISTRICT AND ARE PARTIAL.

3. MAJOR KHUPAI DOST I S D A R. CHIEF OF
SECTION AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MCD).

4. MAJOR GUL B S M A R. CHIEF OF PERSONNEL
(MCD).

5. DEPUTY CHIEF OF ORGANIZATION. A SENIOR OFFICER.
COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME.

(SOURCE COMMENT: ADDITIONAL ARRESTS HAVE ALSO BEEN
MADE.)

(FIELD COMMENT: SEE WHE-4159 FOR A PREVIOUS REPORT
ON ARRESTS OF PRO-TARAKI SUPPORTERS IN THE MILITARY.)

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WHINTEL NOFORN DOCUMENTARY ORGAN
COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN

SUBJECT: 1. APPARENT ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT
HAFIULLAH AMIN.
2. AMBUSH OF BUSES ON OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL.
(BOY: LATE OCTOBER 1978)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE
REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE
ACQUIRED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN AFGHAN ARMY
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

1. IN LATE OCTOBER, A TRUSTED KHALAI OFFICER WHO
STANDS GUARD DUTY AT THE PEOPLE HOUSE WHERE PRESIDENT
HAFIULLAH AMIN'S OFFICE WAS ARRESTED. WHEN
HE TRIED TO SNEAK A PISTOL INTO AN AREA WHERE THE
WHERE NO WEAPONS ARE ALLOWED, EXCEPT THOSE CARRIED
PERSONAL BODYGUARDS. INTERROGATION OF THE KHALAI
INDICATES HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO HIDE THE PISTOL IN
PROHIBITED AREA PRIOR TO ITS BEING USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO
ASSASSINATE AMIN. (SUB-SOURCE COMMENT: PRIOR TO AMIN'S
SEIZURE OF POWER FROM TARAKI, TRUSTED KHALAI OFFICERS
TO THE ARRESTED OFFICER WERE PERMITTED TO CARRY WEAPONS IN THE
PRESENCE OF AMIN AND TARAKI. SINCE AMIN'S ASSASSINATION
PRESIDENCY, ALL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN BANISHED FROM THE
IN THE AREA OF THE PALACE WHERE AMIN LIVED AND VISITORS
VISITORS TO THE PALACE AND CHECKED AT LEAST TWICE WITH
BODY SEARCHES AND X-RAY EQUIPMENT. A METAL DETECTOR
PISTOL THE KHALAI WAS HIDDEN ON HIS BODY.)

2. ON ABOUT 21 OCTOBER, TWO "MOTORCYCLES" (LITTLE
PROPERLY BUSES) WERE STOPPED AT THE PRESS INQUIRY
PITNEY STORAGE TANK ON THE SALAM PALE ROAD ON THE
OUTSKIRTS OF KABUL. THE "MOTORCYCLES" WERE STOPPED
ARMY UNIFORMS WHO WERE KILLED. ONE ONE OF THE
APPROACH TO A REARVIEW MIRROR A GUN, HE WAS SHOT
COMMENTS: THEY BEYOND THE
THE INQUIRY
Y WERE IN AFGHAN
"MOTORCYCLES" DRIVERS
STOLEN THE EYES

REF CLASS S E C R E T UNINTL NOFORN NOCONTRACT

INTRY: AFGHANISTANA/USSR
BJECT: AMMUNITION FLIGHTS TO THE KABUL AREA.
(DOI: OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MIDDLE-LEVEL AFGHAN AIR FORCE OFFICER WHOSE
PAST REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.
HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION IN THE NORMAL COURSE
OF HIS DUTIES.

1. DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF OCTOBER 1979
APPROXIMATELY TEN AN-12 (CUB) AMMUNITION FLIGHTS PER WEEK
ARRIVED AT KHAWAJA RAWASH (KABUL) AND BAGRAM AIR FORCE BASES
FROM THE USSR. THIS IS TWICE THE NUMBER OF AMMUNITION
FLIGHTS AS THOSE WHICH ARRIVED DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS
OF OCTOBER.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: AMMUNITION COMING FROM THE
SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO BE PERMITTED TO FORWARD COMBAT
AREAS BY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PILOTTED BY SOVIET CREWS.)

3. ACQ: AFGHANISTAN, KABUL (31 OCTOBER 1979).
FIELD REPORT NO. NRE-4133.

ALSO SENT LONDON, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KARACHI, TEHRAN,
JIDDA, CINCPAC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAF,
COMSIXTHFLT, COMDEASTFOR, COMPAIRMED, CINCSA, CINCPAC,
CSG, IRAC, PACAF, PACFLT, USMMR SHAPE FOR GENERAL ROGERS,
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WA - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED TO CONTRACT OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANT
NATIONALS - NOT RELEASABLE TO RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
ENV 1 NOV 89 DRV D9C.1 BY REC'D CONTROL-0 OVERALL DOCUMENT
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL-0

BT
#5288

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WINTEL NUMBER NO CONTRACT DECON
 COUNTRY: AFGHANISTAN/USAF
 SUBJECT: SOVIET CONTROL OF SHINDAND AIR FORCE BASE
 (DOI: OCTOBER 1979)
 SOURCE: A MIDDLE EASTERN AFGHAN MILITARY OFFICER, WHOSE NAME
 HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE ACQUIRED THE
 INFORMATION FROM AN AFGHAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

AS OF MID-OCTOBER, SOVIET OFFICERS WITH HQ CENTRAL
 SHINDAND AIR FORCE BASE IN FARAN PROVINCE (SUB-SOURCE
 COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE EXERCISING THE SUPERVISORY CONTROL
 SHINDAND AIR BASE AS THEY DO OVER BAGRAM AIR BASE.
 AFGHANS AT SHINDAND BASE ARE THERE FOR WINDOW DRESSING
 SOVIETS ARE MAKING ALL OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AT THE BASE

ACQ: AFGHANISTAN, KABEL (2 NOVEMBER 1979). FIELD
 NO. NEI-1136.

FIELD DISSEM: BRASSY S&B BATT AT KAD... NEW TO
 ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, KARACHI, TEHRAN, JEDDAH, HANOI,
 ARUR, CINCPACWEST, CINCSAF, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV,
 COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, CSO, IPAC, PACFLT, PACFLT, PACFLT
 FOR GENERAL ROGERS.

CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE - INTX CONTROLLED
 AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELIABLE - FOREIGN
 DIS - NOT RELIABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR
 DIS - DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
 AND BY ORIGINATOR. NEW SHOWS SEE HQ. NOT RECORDED
 OFFICER - ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND
 OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

28 SEP 79

S E C R E T 192213Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 515885.

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO KABUL.

UNINTEL INTED

REF: TEHRAN 54242. (NOT SENT/NEEDED KABUL)

1. FOR KABUL: REF REQUESTS THAT TEHRAN BE ADDED ON AFGHAN SITUATION. REQ LABEL COMPLY.
2. AS A CONTINUATION OF THE STEPS TAKEN TO BEGIN A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT, WE WOULD OFFER LAINGEN TO PROVIDE SELECTED INTEL ORALLY RPT ORALLY AFGHANISTAN TO YAZDI OR BAZARGAN. THESE ITEMS WOULD BE CABLE TO STATION BY HQS TO PASS TO LAINGEN. THE FIRST OF THIS INFO WOULD BE BELOW. LAINGEN SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT INFO BEING PROVIDED IS PART OF EFFORT BEGUN BY THE 22 AUGUST BRIEFING IN IER. HE SHOULD ALSO REQUEST BAZARGAN OR YAZDI FOR ANY CORROBORATION OF THIS INFO WHICH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT HAVE OR BE ABLE TO GET. WE WANT THIS TO ENCOURAGE INTEL DIALOGUE RPT DIALOGUE. YOU MAY ASSURE LAINGEN STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMED OF THIS REQUEST, AND CONCURS.
3. ON 17 AUGUST, A SENIOR SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION LED BY A FOUR STAR GENERAL ARRIVED IN KABUL. THE GENERAL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY 12 OTHER GENERALS AND SIX COLONELS. THE DELEGATION WAS EXPECTED TO REMAIN FOR ABOUT 25 DAYS TO STUDY THE SECURITY SITUATION. THE SOVIET ADVISORY ROLE WITH THE AFGHAN MILITARY HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. IN ADDITION, EARLY SEPTEMBER WE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT SOVIET TROOPS IN BRIGADE STRENGTH HAD ARRIVED IN KABUL POSSIBLY TO PROTECT SOVIET CITIZENS AND FACILITIES. WE DO HAVE RELIABLE INFO THAT APPROXIMATELY 480 SOVIET TROOPS ARE STATIONED AT BAGRAM AIRFIELD, KABUL.
4. ADDRES WILL NOTE STATE 241748 OF 14 SEPTEMBER REGARDING INTEL DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN WITH GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

SP

The Ambassador

December 19, 1970

FOL - Donald R. Toussaint

Your Meeting with Mr. Meir Ekri, Head of the Israeli Mission,
December 21

Mr. Meir Ekri, Chief of the Israeli Mission, is calling on you at 11:00 a.m., December 21. A brief biographic sketch is attached. We understand from Mr. Ekri's staff that the call is principally a goodwill call "in connection with the holidays", but you might, if the occasion arises, probe on the following points:

(1) Israeli assessment of apparent warming of Iran/Arab relations, e.g., renewal of Iran/UAR relations, rumors of the renewal of Iran/Lebanon relations, and slight thaw in Iran/Syria relations.

(2) The Israeli assessment of the Kurdish situation. There are signs that the situation between Barzani and Baghdad is slowly deteriorating, though neither side apparently wants fighting to start again. Because of long time Israeli involvement in the Kurdish question and support for Barzani, we would be interested in Mr. Ekri's assessment of the present situation and his prediction how long it will last.

(3) Iraqi Troops in Jordan. We have recently heard from Iranian charge in Baghdad that the Iraqi troops in Jordan have, for tactical reasons, been moved back very close to the Jordanian side of the Jordan/Iraq border. Do the Israelis have any information on this?

Attachment: Ekri Bio Sketch

FOL:CSMcCaskill:psk

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.



SECRET

Department of State
TELEGRAM

EMBASSY TEHRAN

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

POL-3

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ECON-2
OR-2
CONS
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CRUPOUCH
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15/r/b

ACTION:

SECRET WASHDC IMMEDIATE

2750

INFO: Embassy ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
 Embassy ANKARA IMMEDIATE
 Embassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE
 USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
 Embassy BEIRUT

Mar 25, 75 - 12412

SECRET TEHRAN 2750

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, SHF, IX, IR, US

SUBJECT: Kurdish Refugees

REFS: (A) State 66705 (NOTEL); (B) Tehran 2684 (NOTEL)

1. Embassy knows of one Kurdish approach to a high-level GOI official requesting extension of April 1 deadline on movements across Iran-Iraq border. This was turned down, and new request has been made with no response as yet. Head of Kurdish Democratic Party office in Tehran told newsmen he had approached unnamed GOI official on same matter with same inconclusive results. Tehran ICRC Director Hans Becker made similar approach through Red Lion and Sun society but has not yet received reply.

DRAFTED BY:

POL:MBolster/DCM:JCMiklos

DRAFTING DATE:

3/25/75

TEL NO.:

2112

DCM:JCMiklos

CLEARANCES:

POL:HC
 HMK:GC/Cave

SECRET

11
09/13/75

INDICATE:
 COLLECTY
 CHANGE

MEMBERSHIP TEHRAN

DISTRIBUTION

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ACTION

SECSTATE WASHDC

3281

10 APR 75 1247Z

INFO: **Ambassy ALGIERS**
Ambassy DAMASCUS
Ambassy BEIRUT
Ambassy ANKARA
Ambassy CAIRO
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN-NEW YORK
USCINCEUR
Amconsul KHORRAMSHAHR (POUCH)
Amconsul TABRIZ (POUCH)

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 3281
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: GDS

TRGS: PINS, SREF, IR, LZ

SUBJECT: Iraqi Kurds in Iran

REF: Tabriz 17

1. Subsequent to AmConsul Tabriz Neumann's meeting with Barzani representative (reftel), Neumann met April 7 with Barzani's son Idris in Meghadah, Western Azerbaijan, / Idris made similar arguments, saying that ICRC presence in refugee camps would keep Iranians from pressuring Kurds to return to Iraq. He went further and asked for guarantees from US or from Iran (as result of US influence or pressure) that there

AMBols:mp

DATE/TIME
4/10/75 2112

POB:HMills

DIS:JOMiklos

CONFIDENTIAL

AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION:

Cons

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO.

12996

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 03 1977

INFO:

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Consul

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0274
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 3249
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 261784

FROM NEA/ARN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CASC

SUBJECT: BARZANI'S ENTOURAGE

1. A MEMBER OF MUSTPHA BARZANI'S ENTOURAGE HAS INFORMED US THAT BARZANI WANTS TO BRING SOMEONE TO THE UNITED STATES TO PERFORM GENERAL HOUSEHOLD WORK. THEY HAVE CHOSEN A MUSTAPHA AHMAD AND TOLD US THAT SAVAK HAS AGREED TO GIVE HIM A PASSPORT AND ALLOW AHMAD'S DEPARTURE.

2. SINCE THE SPONSOR IN THE UNITED STATES (BARZANI) HAS NON-IMMIGRANT STATUS, AND AHMAD HAS SOME PRIOR CONNECTION WITH BARZANI, HE APPEARS TO QUALIFY FOR A TEMPORARY VISITOR'S VISA.

3. IF AHMAD APPLIES FOR A VISA, THE EMBASSY SHOULD CHECK WITH SAVAK BEFORE ISSUING. PLEASE NOTIFY US WHEN VISA ISSUED. VANCE

AHMAD, Barzani

*Use: Issued on Refugee Document
11-10-77
BB*

(B-1/B-2, Multiple, 12 mos.) SAVAK APPROVES

[Signature]

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SK

3

VV ESA718BRA591

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Pol 3-
Kurd

PP R UGMHR
DE RUEHC #6730 2410554
ZNY CCCCC ZH
P R 282349Z AUG 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0617
RUQMH/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 4303
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1992
RUMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4065
BT

CN 1172

POL
CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 226730

E.O. 12065 GDS 8/28/85 (DILLERY, C. EDWARD)

TAGS: PEPR, TU, IR

SUBJECT: (C) TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS KURDS IN IRAN; TURKISH AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

1. (O - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. TURKISH AMBASSADOR ELEM DAG CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM AUGUST 27 ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ANKARA TO DISCUSS U.S. VIEWS AND POLICY ON KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAN. IN OPENING CONVERSATION, ELEM DAG SAID GOT HAD RECEIVED CONFUSING WIRE SERVICE REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN'S AUGUST 24 STATEMENT AND RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS. THIS HAD CAUSED ANKARA TO ASK HIM TO CLARIFY U.S. VIEWS AND POLICY WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE DEPARTMENT. HE HAD SEEN COPY OF DEPARTMENT PRESS GUIDANCE (SEPTEL). SPECIFICALLY, ELEM DAG ASKED FOR U.S. "VIEWS AND POSITIONS" ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAN.
3. UNDER SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT US-IRANIAN RELATIONS ARE IMPROVING AFTER NATURAL PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE IN THE WAKE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. NOTING THAT WE HAVE MANY SPECIFIC ISSUES LIKE COMMERCIAL CLAIMS AND MILITARY CONTRACTS, THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SITUATION IS IMPROVING.
4. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THE KURDISH SITUATION IS AN INTERNAL IRANIAN MATTER. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRAN. WE SEE THE KURDISH SITUATION AS ONE OF THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS FACING THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. MR. RESTON HAD COMMENTED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE "QUICK JUSTICE" THAT HAD BEEN METED OUT IN THE KURDISH AREA. HIS COMMENTS WERE ALONG THE LINES OF OUR STANDING OPPOSITION TO EXECUTIONS WITHOUT FAIR TRIALS.

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TEHRAN 10847

0 101327Z OCT 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4190
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC
 RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0321
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0310
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0314
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0292
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0364
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0368
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0363
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0328
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0435
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0293
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0202
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0393
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10847

CHRG: STAT 10/10/79
 APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINOEN
 DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
 CLEAR: POL:JLIMBERT
 A/M:PGAST
 DISTR: POL2 CHRG ICA
 ECON CONS CHRON
 RF DAO A/M

*POL 13
Kurd*

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/10/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
 TAGS: IR, PINT, PINS
 SUBJECT: KURDISH PROBLEMS

REF: TEHRAN 10804

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. ACCORDING TO PRESS AND RADIO REPORTS, IN RESPONSE TO AMBUSH OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS (REYTEL) DEF MIN CHAMRAN HAS FLOWN TO KURDESTAN TO OVERSEE OPERATIONS AGAINST REBELS. AT THE SAME TIME JCS CHIEF SHAKER ANNOUNCED THAT THE ARMY HAD "EXTENSIVE PLANS TO COUNTER THE KURDISH REBELS" AND INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PGOI PLANNED TO TAKE THE WAR OUT OF THE TOWNS INTO THE MOUNTAINS "AFTER THE AREA IS STUDIED."
3. STORY OF AMBUSH SEEMS FAR FROM CLEAR: AMBUSH REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7; IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER 22 OR 52 GUARDSMEN WERE KILLED IN AMBUSH WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE OCCURRED WHEN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WITHDREW FROM GENDARMARIE POST NEAR SARDASHT TO BANEH WITHOUT COORDINATING WITH LOCAL ARMY COMMANDER AND AGAINST HIS
4. CERIMONIES FOR THE SLAIN GUARDS WERE HELD OCTOBER 10 IN CITIES ACROSS IRAN. IN TEHRAN, THE BAZAAR CLOSED AND CERIMONIES WERE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN BUT NO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE APPEARED AT EMBASSY. (OCT 9 DEMONSTRATIONS, ACCORDING TO JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI, WERE ORGANIZED BY TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ISLAMIC STUDENTS SOCIETY AND SHARIF INDUSTRIAL UNIVERSITY MOSLEM STUDENTS ORGANIZATION.)
5. RIGHT-WING ISLAMIC PAPER JUMHURI-E-ISLAMI CONTINUED ITS ATTACKS TODAY ON ALLEGED AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN KURDISTAN FRONT PAGING A GORY PICTURE OF A CHARRED REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ENTITLED "HUMAN RIGHTS AMERICAN

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TEHRAN 10847

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 - 501-028

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REF DIRECTOR

TO STATE

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03

1. THANK
STAFF AND
AND RE-ENTER
ASS STAFF
SHOULD ALSO BE
AND ALLOW HIM

2. C/O
AND TRAVEL
T/1 MAY EXPECT

3. BACK
APPROACH, THAT
THREE WEEKS
PURPOSE OF RECO
LOCATE AND GET
HE WOULD ALSO
THE VARIOUS
BE PROVIDED WITH
STATIONS). T
OTHER THAN THE
24235, T/1
ISRAHIM
DAUGHTER, THE
IS BELIEVED, HE
PERSONALITY
REMAIN IN HIS
DECIPHER THEM.
SUMMONED TO THE

WORK HERE BY T/1 ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFFER RODMAN
INTERPART LEE BEAUCHAMP, SDTHROP/1 (T/1) IS
PATRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE
FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATION. THE
ERRED ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS
WAVE SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITUATI
DATE NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION
T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT
AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEHAL

AND T/1 IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS
AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO
SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED, FOR THE
SUCH FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS HE CAN
UGH THEM, A LINE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OTHER
OF INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS
IONS AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD
AGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
HEN STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY.
MENTIONED IN FR/SF 24337 AND FR/SF
LOCATE IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADER
OF ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN, THROUGH HIS
LOCATION OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY, AS
KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHER KURIDS
REPLY, T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILES
NEFRAN APARTMENT AND SHE WOULD BE HARD PUT
SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE
EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION ON SOME PRETEXT.